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INTRODUCTION 
Negotiations between States are an integral aspect of international relations.
1
 They are the 
most widely used and effective means for promoting bilateral and multilateral cooperation 
between States.
2
 The process of negotiations is largely unregulated at the international level 
strictu sensu.
3
 On the one hand, it is argued that good faith, as normatively recognised in 
Article 2(2) of the UN Charter,
4
 is an underlying principle of international law
5
 that applies, 
among other areas, to international negotiations. On the other hand, the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) has noted that the principle of good faith relates ‘only to the fulfilment of 
existing obligations’.6 However, negotiations are essentially a voluntary process – a right 
stemming from State sovereignty, not an existing obligation.
7
 
Good faith applies to all international negotiations as a moral standard of behaviour.
8
 It is 
natural that a measure of trust and good faith is present or developed between the negotiating 
parties;
9
 however, whether therefrom arises a legal obligation a breach of which would be 
subject to sanctions, is the central question of this master thesis. The aim of the present master 
thesis is to analyse whether in international law States are under a legal obligation to negotiate 
in good faith, the source and essence of such obligation, and the legal consequences of a 
breach thereof. The sources of international law are listed in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the 
                                                 
1
 UNGA Res 53/101 (20 January 1999) UN Doc A/RES/53/101, recitals 4 and 7; K. Wellens. Negotiations in the 
Case Law of the International Court of Justice. A Functional Analysis. Farnham: Ashgate 2014, p 23; M. A. 
Rogoff. The Obligation to Negotiate in International Law: Rules and Realities. – Michigan Journal of 
International Law 1994/16, p 182. 
2
 UNGA Report of the Secretary General (3 September 1998) UN Doc A/53/332, comments by Kyrgyzstan and 
Mongolia. 
3
 In a substantively legal normative sense. G. Korontzis. Making the Treaty in D. B. Hollis (Ed). The Oxford 
Guide to Treaties. New York: Oxford University Press 2012, p 179; T. Hassan. Good Faith in Treaty Formation. 
– Virginia Journal of International Law 1981/21(3), p 470. See also UNGA Report of the Secretary General (3 
September 1998) UN Doc A/53/332, comments by Qatar.  
4
 Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice. – RT II 1996, 24, 95. See 
also Hassan, pp 445-446. 
5
 UNGA Res 25/2625 (24 October 1970) UN Doc A/RES/25/2625; Land and Maritime Boundary between 
Cameroon and Nigeria, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1998, p 275 (hereinafter Cameroon v 
Nigeria Preliminary Objections), para 38; M. N. Shaw. International Law. 6
th
 ed. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2012, p 123. 
6
 Cameroon v Nigeria Preliminary Objections, para 59. See also Border and Transborder Armed Actions 
(Nicaragua v Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1988, p 69 (hereinafter Border 
and Transborder Armed Actions), para 94; Shaw, p 104; Rogoff, p 155. 
7
 Wellens, p 23. 
8
 H. Kelsen and the drafters of the Harvard Draft Convention recognised the moral but not the legal effect of the 
principle of good faith. See H. Kelsen. The Law of the United Nations: a Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental 
Problems: with Supplement. Union (NJ): Lawbook Exchange 2008, p 89; Harvard Law School. Draft 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (Part III; Law of Treaties). – American Journal of International Law, 
Supplement 1935/29 (hereinafter the Harvard Draft Convention), pp 780-781 as referred to in Hassan, pp 445-
446, 465. 
9
 U. Lindell. Modern Multilateral Negotiation: The Consensus Rule and Its Implications in International 
Conferences. Lund: Studentlitteratur 1988, p 80. 
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International Court of Justice (hereinafter the ICJ Statute): international conventions, 
customary international law, general principles of law recognised by civilised nations, and, as 
subsidiary means, judicial decisions, and academic teachings. 
To provide an answer to the research question, it is necessary to answer the following sub-
questions: whether and to what extent is there an obligation to negotiate in good faith in 
international treaty law; whether and to what extent is there an obligation to negotiate in good 
faith in customary international law; whether the obligation to negotiate in good faith is a 
general principle of law common to domestic legal systems; is the obligation to negotiate in 
good faith applicable to all negotiations between States; how is the obligation to negotiate in 
good faith substantiated; and what consequences derive from the breach of this obligation. 
The author raises the main hypothesis that in international law States are under a legal 
obligation to negotiate in good faith and its breach is subject to legal sanctions. Five sub-
hypotheses are drawn that help to test the main hypothesis. First, in international treaty law 
the obligation to negotiate in good faith is recognised only to a limited extent. Second, the 
obligation to negotiate in good faith has become a rule of customary international law. Third, 
it is not a general principle of law common to domestic legal systems. Fourth, the customary 
international law principle of good faith negotiations applies to all negotiations between 
States. Fifth, the breach of the obligation to negotiate in good faith entails legal consequences 
under the VCLT and the law of State responsibility. 
The obligation to negotiate in good faith is of timeless relevance as negotiations are an 
everyday part of international relations. Good faith is a prerequisite for successful 
negotiations – it enhances the predictability of negotiating parties by reducing uncertainty and 
promoting an atmosphere of trust at negotiations.
10
 However, good faith is a vague notion 
which is difficult to define. A lack of clear legal rules concerning the conduct of negotiations 
provides too much room for different interpretations.
11
 Thus, an analysis of the essence of the 
obligation to negotiate in good faith would provide legal clarity for States regarding their 
rights and obligations when conducting or breaking off negotiations. Safeguarding one’s 
interests and improving the bargaining position is especially important for smaller States, 
such as Estonia, in negotiations at both the bilateral and multilateral levels.
12
  
On the one hand, States should not be afraid to invoke their rights corresponding to a breach 
of the obligation to negotiate in good faith. On the other hand, a clearly stated rule which is 
                                                 
10
 UNGA Res 53/101 (20 January 1999) UN Doc A/RES/53/101, recital 8. 
11
 UNGA Report of the Secretary General (3 September 1998) UN Doc A/53/332, comments by Mongolia. 
12
 Ibid, comments by Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. 
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applied consistently will exert a pull toward compliance.
13
 It serves to ensure the stability of 
international relations and the well-being of the community by aiming to avoid incalculable 
harm. Thus, the obligation to negotiate in good faith is of particular relevance in matters of 
urgency, such as peace negotiations. 
The obligation to negotiate in good faith is of particular relevance today as the issues being 
negotiated have become increasingly complex and intertwined with issues in other 
negotiations. The conduct during and result of negotiations might have important implications 
to the negotiating States’ relations and negotiations with other States. Increasingly, 
negotiations take place between States and international organisations, where the latter enjoy 
an inherently stronger bargaining position. While the master thesis is concerned with 
negotiations between States, the obligation to negotiate in good faith should be seen as 
applicable to negotiations between States and international organisations or between 
international organisations.  
The issue of good faith negotiations is not merely theoretical; it has also been on the agenda 
of international courts. At the moment, a case is pending in the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration (PCA) where Timor-Leste is seeking to invalidate a treaty with Australia on the 
grounds of fraud.
14
 As another example, the Marshall Islands have brought claims against the 
United Kingdom, India and Pakistan, alleging that they have breached their duty to undertake 
good faith negotiations on effective measures on cessation of the nuclear arms race and on a 
treaty on nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
15
 (NPT).
16
 
For the purposes of the master thesis, the author has worked through and qualitatively 
analysed both international and domestic law, case law and academic literature in English in 
order to provide a systematic overview of the current state of international law with regard to 
the obligation to negotiate in good faith and the consequences of its breach. By way of both 
                                                 
13
 Rogoff, p 173. 
14
 Permanent Court of Arbitration. Arbitration under the Timor Sea Treaty (Timor-Leste v Australia). – 
http://www.pcacases.com/web/view/37 (11 April 2016); K. Mitchell and D. Akande. Espionage & Good Faith in 
Treaty Negotiations: East Timor v Australia (20 January 2014). – http://www.ejiltalk.org/espionage-fraud-good-
faith-in-treaty-negotiations-east-timor-v-australia-in-the-permanent-court-of-arbitration/ (11 April 2016). 
15
 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. – RT II 1999, 10, 64. 
16
 Application instituting proceedings against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland by the 
Republic of the Marshall Islands to the International Court of Justice (24 April 2014). – http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/160/18296.pdf (1 May 2016); Application instituting proceedings against the Republic of 
India by the Republic of the Marshall Islands to the International Court of Justice (24 April 2014). – 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/158/18292.pdf (1 May 2016); Application instituting proceedings against the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan by the Republic of the Marshall Islands to the International Court of Justice (24 
April 2014). – http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/159/18294.pdf (1 May 2016). 
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analysis and synthesis of the sources, the author has made inferences in order to answer the 
posed research question and sub-questions. The author has made use of the comparative 
method in ascertaining whether the obligation to negotiate in good faith could be a general 
principle of law recognised by civilised nations (ICJ Statute Article 38(1)(c)).  
As recognition by all domestic legal systems is not required under Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ 
Statute, the comparative analysis is not exhaustive but is based on a comparison of the 
representative domestic legal systems of the largest and most influential legal traditions – the 
civil law tradition and the common law tradition.
17
 The sample representative States are 
chosen based on K. Zweigert and H. Kötz’s macro level comparative law division of legal 
families,
18
 and include Germany, France, and the Netherlands in the civil law tradition, and 
England, the USA, Australia, and Canada in the common law tradition. The comparison is 
limited to private law – mostly contract law and tort law, under which the issues of pre-
contractual liability are most often dealt with. The comparative analysis has a heavier focus 
on the common law legal tradition as the issue is more controversial there. Since the author of 
the master thesis is from a civil law background and has only little prior personal 
acquaintance with common law, she has relied on secondary literature in that regard. In 
addition, the author has had to rely on English secondary literature regarding German, French 
and Dutch case law. 
Based on the above, the master thesis is composed of three parts. The first chapter provides an 
overview and analysis of the obligation to negotiate in good faith in international law. Section 
1.1 provides an overview of the general international law principle of good faith. Section 1.2 
analyses treaty law and customary international law regarding the obligation to negotiate in 
good faith. Section 1.3 analyses the applicability of the obligation to negotiate in good faith to 
all negotiations, i.e. lacking an express conventional or general international law obligation to 
negotiate. The second chapter of the master thesis undertakes a comparative analysis of pre-
contractual liability in domestic legal systems in order to establish whether the obligation to 
negotiate in good faith derives from domestic legal systems as a general principle of law 
recognised by civilised nations. Section 2.1 describes the nature and method of derivation of 
general principles of law. Section 2.2 provides a brief overview of instruments which seem to 
support the existence of a generally recognised obligation to negotiate in good faith. Sections 
2.3 and 2.4 discuss the approaches to the principle of good faith and obligation to negotiate in 
                                                 
17
 J. H. Merryman and R. Pérez-Perdomo. Two Legal Traditions in J. H. Merryman and R. Pérez-Perdomo. The 
Civil Law Tradition. An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Europe and Latin America. 3
rd
 ed. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press 2007, pp 1-5. 
18
 K. Zweigert and H. Kötz. An Introduction to Comparative Law. 3rd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1998, p 73. 
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good faith in the civil law and common law legal traditions, respectively. Section 2.5 provides 
a conclusion and implications of the comparative analysis. In the third chapter of the master 
thesis, the legal consequences of a breach of the obligation to negotiate in good faith are 
outlined. Section 3.1 deals with consequences deriving from the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT)
19
 and Section 3.2 with consequences under the Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA).
20
 Section 3.3 
exemplifies the consequences of a breach of the obligation to negotiate in good faith in Article 
VI of the NPT. 
The author would like to express her gratitude to her supervisor Katre Luhamaa for 
constructive feedback and encouragement and to family and friends for their love and support. 
Keywords: public international law, international negotiations, good faith, comparative law, 
State responsibility. 
                                                 
19
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. – RT II 2007, 15. 
20
 UNGA Res 56/83, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (28 January 2002) UN Doc 
A/RES/56/83 (hereinafter ARSIWA). 
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1 OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Negotiations are an integral aspect of international relations in the creation of new 
international norms of conduct of States and in the peaceful settlement of disputes.
21
 
Essentially, negotiations are a voluntary process,
22
 but in certain circumstances the duty to 
negotiate has a general international law or a conventional basis.
23
 The process of negotiations 
is largely unregulated at the international level.
24
 The present master thesis aims to establish 
whether and to what extent there is a general obligation to negotiate treaties in good faith. 
For the purposes of the present master thesis, ‘negotiations’ are defined as a ‘process in which 
explicit communication is exchanged in an attempt to reach agreement on the realization of a 
common goal’, including the drafting of the treaty.25 In order to have as all-embracing 
definition as possible, the definition dispenses with the requirement of the presence of 
conflicting interests,
26
 although these are often, but not necessarily, inherent in the 
negotiations. The result of successful negotiations is a ‘treaty’, which is defined as an 
international agreement governed by international law and concluded in written form between 
States, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and 
whatever its particular designation.
27
  
This chapter of the master thesis gives an overview of the general principle of good faith in 
international law (section 1.1) followed by an analysis of treaty and customary law regarding 
the obligation to negotiate in good faith and the interpretation of the obligation in the practice 
of the international judiciary (section 1.2).  Section 1.3 provides an analysis of the 
applicability of the principle of good faith to all international negotiations.  
1.1 The Principle of Good Faith in International Law 
The principle of good faith is an underlying principle of international law.
28
 However, it is 
vague, difficult to define, and its application largely depends on the prevailing 
                                                 
21
 UNGA Res 53/101 (20 January 1999) UN Doc A/RES/53/101, recitals 4 and 7; Wellens, p 23; Rogoff, p 182. 
22
 Wellens, p 23. 
23
 Wellens, pp 23-26. 
24
 Korontzis in Hollis, p 179; Hassan, p 470. 
25
 Lindell, p 21. See also Rogoff, p 147. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 VCLT Article 2(1)(a). 
28
 Cameroon v Nigeria, para 38; Shaw, p 123. 
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circumstances.
29
 An overview of the scope and applicability of the principle of good faith in 
international law is warranted to understand whether and to what extent it informs the 
obligation to negotiate in good faith. 
J. F. O’Connor has undertaken the difficult task and provides a definition of the principle of 
good faith in international law: 
The principle of good faith in international law is a fundamental principle from which the rule pacta 
sunt servanda and other legal rules distinctively and directly related to honesty, fairness and 
reasonableness are derived, and the application of these rules is determined at any particular time by the 
competing standards of honesty, fairness and reasonableness prevailing in the international community 
at that time.
30
 
G. S. Goodwin-Gill provides a non-exhaustive list of different contexts where the principle of 
good faith operates: 
1) to settle disputes in good faith; 
2) to negotiate in good faith; 
3) having signed a treaty, not to frustrate the achievement of its object and purpose prior 
to ratification; 
4) having ratified a treaty, to apply and perform it in good faith; 
5) to interpret treaties in good faith; 
6) to fulfil in good faith any obligations arising from other sources of international law; 
7) to exercise rights in good faith.31 
The scope of the principle of good faith can be further clarified by reference to its sub-
principles or concretisations, such as protection of legitimate expectations, estoppel, 
acquiescence, equity, and the prohibition of abuse of rights and discretion.
32
 They mostly 
reinforce the duty to perform obligations arising from international law in good faith but may 
have wider implications. 
In the following subsections the applicability of the principle of good faith to the performance 
of international obligations and in the context of dispute settlement is discussed. 
                                                 
29
 Shaw, p 123. 
30
 J. F. O’Connor. Good Faith in International Law. Aldershot: Dartmouth 1991, pp 124, 37-42. 
31
 G. S. Goodwin-Gill. State Responsibility and the ‘Good Faith’ Obligation in International Law in M. 
Fitzmaurice and D. Sarooshi (Eds). Issues of State Responsibility Before International Judicial Institutions. The 
Clifford Chance Lectures. Vol 7. Oxford and Portland Oregon: Hart Publishing 2004, p 88 (footnotes omitted). 
32
 O’Connor, pp 37-42; A. R. Ziegler and J. Baumgartner, Good Faith as a General Principle of (International) 
Law in A. D. Mitchell, M. Sornarajah, and T. Voon (Eds). Good Faith and International Economic Law. Oxford 
Scholarship Online 2015, p 12; S. Reinhold. Good Faith in International Law. – UCL Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence 2013/40(2), p 47. 
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1.1.1 Obligation of Good Faith Performance of International Obligations 
The principle of good faith is enshrined in Article 2(2) of the UN Charter and elaborated upon 
in the UNGA Resolution 25/2625 entitled ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States’ (hereinafter the Friendly 
Relations Declaration). Both refer to the principle of good faith in the context of fulfilling 
obligations resulting from international law, namely, the UN Charter and international law 
generally, including treaties, respectively. Similarly, Article 26 of the VCLT, enshrining the 
general principle of pacta sunt servanda, provides that ‘[e]very treaty in force is binding upon 
the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.’ The third recital of the 
preamble of the VCLT provides that ‘the principles of free consent and of good faith and the 
pacta sunt servanda rule are universally recognized.’ 
For the purposes of the master thesis, the pacta sunt servanda rule is of importance where 
States have undertaken an obligation to negotiate in good faith by virtue of an express treaty 
provision (see also subsection 1.2.2). Pacta sunt servanda rule means that ‘states cannot 
unilaterally modify, or free themselves from, the terms of a treaty as long as it is in force’.33 
The duty to perform a treaty in good faith involves the good faith interpretation of the 
respective treaty obligations.
34
 The ICJ has emphasised in the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project 
case that a treaty needs to be applied in a reasonable way and good faith treaty performance 
implies that the purpose of the treaty and the parties’ intentions prevail over its literal 
application.
35
 The duty to perform a treaty in good faith also includes the duty not to defeat 
the object and purpose of the treaty, an idea also reflected but having a more limited effect in 
Article 18 of the VCLT.
36
 It also encompasses a duty to settle disputes concerning treaty 
interpretation peacefully and to exercise rights arising from the treaty in good faith.
37
 
Article 62 of the VCLT on the fundamental change of circumstances and the procedure to be 
followed with respect to invocation of invalidity, termination, withdrawal from or suspension 
of the operation of a treaty in Articles 65-67 of the VCLT also implies an obligation of good 
                                                 
33
 Ziegler and Baumgartner in Mitchell et al., p 18. 
34
 K. Schmalenbach in O. Dörr and K. Schmalenbach (Eds). Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. A 
Commentary. Heidelberg: Springer 2012, VCLT Article 26/46. 
35
 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1997, p 7 (hereinafter 
Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project), para 142. See also Schmalenbach in Dörr, VCLT Article 26/46. 
36
 Schmalenbach in Dörr, VCLT Article 26/49-50; Ziegler and Baumgartner in Mitchell et al., p 18. In SR 
Waldock’s third report the Article on pacta sunt servanda included a provision stating that ‘[g]ood faith, inter 
alia, requires that a party to a treaty shall refrain from any acts calculated to prevent the due execution of the 
treaty or otherwise to frustrate its objects.’ See Schmalenbach in Dörr and Schmalenbach, VCLT Article 26/6. 
Regarding Article 18 of the VCLT, see subsection 1.2.1.2. 
37
 Ziegler and Baumgartner in Mitchell et al., p 11. 
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faith.
38
 Namely, the invoking State must provide other parties with a written, reasoned 
notification of its claim (invalidity, suspension, termination), and in case of objections resort 
to peaceful dispute settlement means as indicated in Article 33 of the UN Charter (VCLT 
Articles 65(1), (3), and 67(1)). 
The requirement of good faith performance also applies to obligations resulting from 
international law generally. R. Kolb argues that the principle of protection of all legitimate 
expectations has been induced from the principle of pacta sunt servanda to protect legitimate 
interests provoked in another person through a certain course of conduct and is necessary in 
order to ensure mutual trust, legal certainty, and stability of international relations.
39
 Its 
further forms are the principles of estoppel and acquiescence,
40
 which are often difficult to 
distinguish from each other.
41
 
Estoppel 
Estoppel in international law is a substantive rule founded on the principles of good faith and 
consistency that ought to prevail throughout international relations.
42
 The principle of 
estoppel prohibits a party to adopt a legal position conflicting its own previous conduct or 
representations when another party has relied on such conduct or representations to its 
detriment or to the benefit of the former party.
43
 It has its origins in common law estoppel;
44
 
however, estoppel in international law is not limited to procedural issues
45
 and is less 
                                                 
38
 See also O’Connor, pp 108-112. 
39
 Nuclear Tests (Australia v France), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, p 253 and Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v 
France), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, p 477 (hereinafter Nuclear Tests), para 49; R. Kolb. Principles as Sources 
of International Law (with Special Reference to Good Faith). – Netherlands International Law Review 2006/53, 
pp 10, 13; Ziegler and Baumgartner in Mitchell et al., p 17.  
40
 Kolb, p 8; Ziegler and Baumgartner in Mitchell et al., p 17. For more detail see H. Thirlway. The Law and 
Procedure of the International Court of Justice. Fifty Years of Jurisprudence. Vol 1 and Vol 2. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2013, pp 27-43. 
41
 N. S. M. Antunes. Acquiescence. – Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law 2006, para 24. 
42
 A. Aust. Modern Treaty Law and Practice. 2
nd
 ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007, p 54; I. 
Brownlie. Principles of public international law. 6th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008, pp 420-421. 
43
 Aust, pp 54-55; Shaw, p 102; Brownlie, pp 420-422; Reinhold, p 54; Ziegler and Baumgartner in Mitchell et 
al., p 20; Nigeria Preliminary Objections, para 57; Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v 
Thailand), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1962, p 6 (hereinafter Temple case), Dissenting Opinion of Sir Percy 
Spender, pp 143-144. 
44
 In common law, estoppel takes several forms, eg proprietary and promissory estoppel (see also subsection 
2.4.5 below). International law has not recognised promissory estoppel yet, although the binding effect of 
unilateral acts can be explained on this. See T. Cottier and J. P. Müller, Estoppel. – Max Planck Encyclopaedia 
of Public International Law 2007, para 5. 
45
  Procedurally, estoppel (by representation) operates as a rule of evidence, prohibiting a party to litigation to act 
in contradiction with its claims in the litigation. Estoppel may prevent the assertion of a particular fact in court, 
or exercising a certain right, or from bringing a particular claim in contradiction with a former representation. 
See Argentina-Chile Frontier Case, Argentina v Chile, Award, (1969) XVI RIAA 109, p 164. 
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technical than estoppel in municipal law.
46
 Therefore, its incidence and effects in international 
law are not uniform.
47
 On the one hand, it can operate as a principle of equity and justice in 
judicial reasoning, and on the other hand, as a restrictive concept it can operate 
independently.
48
  
Analogically to principles of municipal law, the requirements of estoppel are ‘(a) an 
unambiguous statement of fact; (b) which is voluntary, unconditional, and authorized; and (c) 
which is relied on in good faith to the detriment of the other party or to the advantage of the 
party making the statement.’49 It is suggested that the restrictive concept, which is prevalent, 
is not a universally adopted general principle of law but rather based upon a ‘combination of 
general principles of law, precedent, and doctrine, resulting in a norm of customary 
international law.’50 The typical effect of estoppel is precluding the representing party from 
adopting the conflicting position.
51
 Thus, where States are under an obligation to negotiate, 
estoppel could prohibit making conflicting representations during negotiations or even to 
break off negotiations in bad faith. 
Acquiescence 
The second form of the principle of the protection of legitimate interests – acquiescence – 
aims to protect the existing state of affairs and requires that the facts and claims are well 
known, tolerated generally by the international community and for a long time by the State(s) 
whose interests are specifically affected.
52
 Distinct from estoppel, acquiescence is not subject 
to the requirement of detrimental reliance.
53
 Consent by acquiescence denotes a State’s tacit 
and unilateral consent through inaction or silence in circumstances where the passive State 
should have protested.
54
 As a result, rights and obligations may be created, modified, disposed 
of, or terminated.
55
 The obligations thus consented to must be performed in good faith. 
                                                 
46
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Therefore, as a result of acquiescence a State might become bound by a duty to negotiate but 
the principle does not regulate States’ conduct during the performance of the obligation. 
Abuse of Rights 
The duty of good faith performance is not only concerned with obligations but also with the 
exercise of rights arising from a treaty or under general international law. The prohibition of 
the abuse of rights doctrine helps to balance conflicting rights and interests in international 
law.
56
 No theory of abuse of rights in the international sphere has been affirmed in the ICJ’s 
jurisprudence but this may be a matter of terminology resulting from the use of the ‘good 
faith’ language instead.57 Based on some dicta by individual judges, G. Fitzmaurice has 
formulated the doctrine of abuse of rights based upon a duty to exercise rights in good faith: 
The essence of the doctrine is that although a State may have a strict right to act in a particular way, it 
must not exercise this right in such a manner as to constitute an abuse of it; it must exercise its rights in 
good faith and with a sense of responsibility; it must have bona fide reasons for what it does and not act 
arbitrarily or capriciously.
58
 
Firstly, the doctrine prohibits malicious, arbitrary, or fictitious exercise of one’s rights.59 
Secondly, it requires exercising rights reasonably and in good faith where others’ rights might 
be negatively affected.
60
 Thirdly, it prohibits abuse of discretion, i.e. requires discretion to be 
‘exercised honestly, sincerely, reasonably, in conformity with the spirit of the law and with 
due regard to the interests of others’.61 Fourthly, it prohibits abuse of procedural instruments 
and rights.
62
 Knowingly abusing one’s rights amounts to bad faith.63 The doctrine of the abuse 
of rights implies that where a State exercises its sovereign right to enter into negotiations, it 
must do so with a sincere intent to reach agreement and not for some ulterior motives. In 
addition, it must also exercise in good faith its right not to conclude an agreement, i.e. not 
withdraw from negotiations arbitrarily. Internationally, however, good faith is presumed, and 
it might be difficult to rebut this presumption.
64
 
                                                 
56
 Ziegler and Baumgartner in Mitchell et al., p 31; Reinhold, pp 49-51. 
57
 Thirlway, p 22. 
58
 G. Fitzmaurice. The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: General Principles and 
Substantive Law. – British Yearbook of International Law 1950/27, pp 12-13. 
59
 Ziegler and Baumgartner in Mitchell et al., p 31. 
60
 Ibid, p 32. 
61
 Ibid. 
62
 Ibid, pp 32-33. 
63
 G. White. The Principle of Good Faith in V. Lowe and C. Warbrick (Eds). The United Nations and the 
Principles of International Law — Essays in Memory of M. Akehurst. London/NY: Routledge 1994, p 244. 
64
 E.g. Tacna-Arica question, Chile v Peru, (1925) II RIAA 921 (hereinafter Tacna-Arica question), pp 929-930; 
Lake Lanoux Arbitration, Spain v France, (1957) XII RIAA 281 (hereinafter Lake Lanoux), para 9. See also 
Hassan, p 450; White in Lowe and Warbrick, pp 244, 246. 
15 
 
Equity 
The duty to perform obligations in good faith is further reinforced by equity. Equity in 
international law is not itself a source of law but refers to principles, such as fairness and 
reasonableness in the administration of justice, constituting the values of the system necessary 
to give meaning to abstract legal norms (equity infra legem) or fill gaps of international law 
(equity praeter legem).
65
 It is to be distinguished from taking a decision ex aequo et bono, i.e. 
outside the law.
66
 Equitable principles might also be used in derogation of the law (equity 
contra legem), however, in this case it is difficult to distinguish them from both equity praeter 
legem and decisions ex aequo et bono.
67
 Sometimes the concretisations of the principle of 
good faith, such as pacta sunt servanda, prohibition of abuse of rights, and rebus sic stantibus 
(fundamental change of circumstances) are considered equitable principles.
68
 Thus, while 
equity cannot be the source of the obligation to negotiate in good faith, equitable principles 
may help the court to assess whether the parties have breached it. 
1.1.2 Peaceful Settlement of Disputes 
The obligation to settle disputes peacefully deserves separate attention. Peaceful settlement of 
disputes that are likely to endanger international peace and security is required by Articles 
2(3) and 33 of the UN Charter. The ICJ has held that obligations under Article 33 of the UN 
Charter are mutual and imperative.
69
 The obligation concerns rather the peaceful mode of 
settlement as opposed to the use of force once settlement is sought. Obligation to negotiate 
disputes that endanger international peace and security is derived from the general and 
customary international law principles of duty of co-operation
70
 and of peaceful settlement of 
disputes,
71
 which is complementary to the prohibition of the use of force.
72
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The Friendly Relations Declaration encourages States to seek ‘early and just settlement [of 
all] of their international disputes’ by means referred to in Article 33 of the UN Charter.73 
However, settlement by formal and legal procedures is consensual in character and, thus, 
there is no obligation in general international law, i.e. lacking a special treaty provision or a 
Security Council resolution to that regard, to settle all kind of disputes.
74
 As examples, 
according to Article 65(3) of the VCLT a dispute concerning the validity of a treaty is to be 
settled through the means indicated in Article 33 of the UN Charter; Article 283(1) of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
75
 requires States to ‘proceed 
expeditiously to an exchange of views regarding [the dispute’s] settlement by negotiation or 
other peaceful means.’ Nevertheless, once States have resorted to peaceful settlement of 
disputes, Article 2(2) and (3) of the UN Charter require that the process of settlement is 
conducted in good faith.  
One of the methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes listed in Article 33 of the UN 
Charter is negotiations. Negotiations in the dispute settlement context refer to 
communications, without third-party involvement, aiming for a consensual resolution to a 
dispute.
76
 As any other treaty, such resolution is legitimised by State consent, bearing in mind 
that some power disparities are inevitable.
77
 The international judiciary has given meaning to 
the obligation to negotiate in good faith where an obligation to negotiate has a general 
international law or conventional basis and in the dispute settlement context.
78
  
The gap-filling function of general principles of international law, such as good faith, results 
in their applicability as guides in a decision-making process only where treaty or customary 
law based concretisations are lacking.
79
 The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) 
and the ICJ have confirmed that from the principle of pacta sunt servanda stems an obligation 
to negotiate in good faith. However, the ICJ has also noted that the principle of good faith 
relates ‘only to the fulfilment of existing obligations’.80 Hence, the principle of good faith 
does not by itself obligate a State to enter into negotiations.
81
 The next sections aim to analyse 
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to what extent are treaty negotiations regulated under treaty law and customary international 
law that – as opposed to the general principles of international law – are not subsidiary 
means.
82
 
1.2 Obligation to Negotiate in Good Faith in International Treaty and Customary Law 
This section analyses whether and to what extent are international negotiations regulated 
under the VCLT – the main source of reference for the conclusion of treaties (subsection 
1.2.1). It further brings examples of pactum de negotiando, i.e. agreements to negotiate, and 
discusses how, based on these, the international judiciary has given substance to the 
obligation to negotiate in good faith (subsection 1.2.2). Finally, the possible customary law 
status of the duties of good faith during negotiations is assessed (subsection 1.2.3). 
1.2.1 Good Faith in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
The principle of good faith is expressly referred to in Articles 26 and 31 of the VCLT, which 
concern good faith performance and interpretation of treaties, respectively.
83
 However, the 
obligation to negotiate in good faith, which is of interest to the present master thesis, concerns 
the behaviour of States during the process of drawing up and adoption of the text of the treaty, 
i.e. during the ‘pre-contractual’ negotiation period, which according to G. Korontzis has ‘not 
really been made the object of any international regulation strictu sensu.’84 
The VCLT, which defines negotiations as the drafting and adoption process of a treaty,
85
  
does not include an express obligation to negotiate treaties in good faith.  Thus, of importance 
for the present analysis are articles of the VCLT regulating States’ behaviour before a treaty’s 
entry into force. For the adoption of treaties, the requirement of consent is of utmost 
importance and, accordingly, grounds for invalidating consent, such as fraud, corruption, 
coercion, and illegal use of force, representing examples of bad faith conduct during treaty 
negotiations will be discussed.
86
 In addition, Article 18 of the VCLT imposing the obligation 
to refrain from acts defeating the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force, 
and especially its negotiating history, provide useful insights for the purposes of the present 
master thesis. 
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1.2.1.1 The Requirement of Consent and Grounds for Its Invalidity 
Recital 3 of the preamble of the VCLT emphasises the universal recognition of the principles 
of free consent, good faith, and the pacta sunt servanda rule. Deriving from the concept of the 
sovereignty of States enshrined in Article 2(1) of the UN Charter, expression of consent is a 
manifestation of States’ intention to be bound by a treaty, which is required for a treaty to be 
valid and have legal effect.
87
 Such intention to be legally bound by an agreement is essential 
for successful treaty negotiations.
88
 Article 11 of the VCLT is a reminder of this requirement 
by listing possible means of expressing consent: signature, exchange of instruments 
constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or any other agreed 
means. In addition, Article 9 bases the adoption of the treaty text on the consent of the 
negotiating States or a vote. However, expressing consent to be bound and becoming a party 
to a treaty does not always require that the State has taken part in the negotiations. 
Articles 46-53 of the VCLT exhaustively list the grounds of invalidity of a State’s consent to 
be bound by a treaty (VCLT Article 42(1)).
89
 Articles 46 and 47 concern the competence and 
authority to conclude a treaty, Article 48 an error, and Article 53 of the VCLT a treaty’s 
conflict with jus cogens norms. These grounds of invalidity do not relate to the bad faith 
conduct of States during negotiations and will not be discussed in the master thesis. The focus 
is on Articles 49-52 of the VCLT that protect the freedom of consent of the defrauded, 
corrupted, or coerced State (representative) from the bad faith of the defrauding, corrupting, 
or coercing State.
90
 
Fraud 
Article 49 of the VCLT provides that ‘[i]f a State has been induced to conclude a treaty by the 
fraudulent conduct of another negotiating State, the State may invoke the fraud as invalidating 
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its consent to be bound by the treaty.’91 Fraud is the clearest antitheses of good faith.92 
Objectively, fraudulent conduct requires the inducement of an error in the other negotiating 
State by means of explicit or implicit misrepresentation or deception, e.g. by making false 
representations.
93
 Exceptionally, non-disclosure of information may, depending on the nature 
of the contract and the prevailing circumstances, qualify as misrepresentation when disclosure 
is required by good faith, i.e. is legitimately expected.
94
 It is doubtful whether a lack of 
intention to perform a treaty would amount to fraudulent conduct.
95
  
A fraudulent causation of error is capable of invalidating consent ‘if the error relates to a fact 
or situation which was assumed by the [invoking] State to exist at the time when the treaty 
was concluded and formed an essential basis of its consent to be bound by the treaty’ (VCLT 
Article 48(1)).
96
 An error is inexcusable and cannot be invoked if the State in question 
contributed to the error by its own conduct or circumstances were such as to put that State on 
notice of a possible error (VCLT Article 48(2)). 
Subjectively, fraudulent conduct requires the intention to deceive, i.e. firstly, awareness of the 
untruthfulness of the representation or of the other negotiating State’s misapprehension. 
Secondly, intention to deceive requires the intention to mislead, i.e. to cause, maintain, or 
corroborate an error on the part of the other negotiating State ‘with a view to inducing that 
State to give consent to a treaty’.97 
As an intriguing example, in April 2013, Timor-Leste instituted arbitral proceedings against 
Australia at the PCA
98
 alleging the invalidity of the 2006 Treaty on Certain Maritime 
Arrangements in the Timor Sea on the grounds of fraud because Australia engaged in 
espionage in the course of negotiating the Treaty. It is allegedly the first case in which a state 
seeks invalidity of a treaty on the grounds of fraud.
99
 The details of the arbitration have not 
been made public and the proceedings are still pending at the PCA. Timor-Leste also initiated 
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proceedings against Australia in the ICJ but dropped the case after the ICJ had ordered 
provisional measures.
100
 
Corruption and Coercion 
In addition to fraud, bad faith is also manifest in corruptive and coercive conduct that can be 
invoked to invalidate a State’s consent to be bound by a treaty. Direct or indirect corruption of 
a representative of a State by another negotiating State (VCLT Article 50) means promising, 
offering, or giving the representative of another negotiating State an undue substantial 
pecuniary or non-pecuniary advantage ‘in order to induce him or her to give consent to a 
treaty, which he or she would otherwise not have given.’101 
Coercion of a representative of a State (VCLT Article 51) refers to procurement of consent 
through acts or threats directed against the representative in his or her private capacity and 
affecting his or her personal sphere, such as life, physical well-being, reputation, or people 
closest to him or her, ‘which induce such fear in the representative, that he or she feels 
compelled to express the represented State’s consent to be bound by the treaty in a manner 
which he or she would not have done without such compulsion.’102 While for the purposes of 
the present master thesis, it is of importance that coercion by a negotiating State is a ground 
invalidating consent, Article 51 of the VCLT also encompasses coercion by third parties.
103
 
Threat or Use of Force 
Finally, Article 52 of the VCLT provides that a ‘treaty is void if its conclusion has been 
procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law 
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.’104 Threat or use of force is customarily to be 
understood as in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibiting threat or use of armed force, and 
excluding political or economic coercion.
105
 The ‘Declaration on the Prohibition of Military, 
Political or Economic Coercion in the Conclusion of Treaties’ and the ‘Dissemination 
Resolution’ accompanying it,106 set the stage for a change in general practice and opinio juris 
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regarding the definition of force for the purposes of the law of treaties.
107
 However, 
international courts and tribunals have adopted a rather restrictive approach according to 
which ‘non-military coercion invalidates the rule if and only if it is obvious and out of 
proportion to the usual practices, which cannot be avoided, in an international society strongly 
marked by an imbalance of power.’108 
To summarise, the VCLT recognises an obligation to negotiate treaties in good faith at least to 
the extent that it prohibits fraudulent, corruptive, and coercive conduct and illegal use of force 
by negotiating States. Since these are clearly established manifestations of bad faith conduct 
during negotiations, the author limits herself to making only a few comments of their status 
under customary international law or as general principles of law recognised by civilised 
nations in subsection 1.3. The process and consequences of invoking these grounds of 
invalidity will be discussed in subsection 3.1 of the master thesis. 
1.2.1.2 Obligation Not to Defeat the Object and Purpose of the Treaty 
Article 18 of the VCLT imposes upon States an obligation not to frustrate the object and 
purpose of a treaty and of individual treaty provisions prior to its entry into force when:
109
 
(a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, 
acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or  
(b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the treaty and 
provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed. 
It aims to protect the negotiated agreement’s rationale and the legitimate expectation of the 
other participants in the treaty-making process.
110
 Thus, Article 18 of the VCLT is a 
concretisation of the general principle of good faith.
111
 It is an autonomous obligation under 
general international law and reflects customary international law.
112
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The obligation has been criticised as being vague and ineffective.
113
 Regarding the content of 
the obligation, Article 18 of the VCLT, as opposed to provisional application in Article 25 of 
the VCLT, does not give full effect to the substance of the treaty.
114
 The threshold for 
violating Article 18 of the VCLT is much higher than that for violating the treaty and refers to 
acts (or inactions),
115
 whether committed intentionally in bad faith or not, rendering the 
subsequent performance of the treaty (provisions) impossible or inoperative, i.e. 
meaningless.
116
 Possible examples include unilaterally creating situations of supervening 
impossibility of performance (Article 61 VCLT), fundamental change of circumstances 
(Article 62 VCLT), and engaging in conduct which would amount to a ‘material breach’ if the 
treaty were already in force (Article 62 VCLT), i.e. ‘the violation of a provision essential to 
the accomplishment of the object and purpose of a treaty’.117  
Regarding effectiveness, the responsibility of a breaching State can only be invoked by States 
that have consented to the treaty.
118
 They could claim cessation of the wrongful conduct and 
reparation, including the re-establishment of the pre-existing situation.
119
 Since the 
‘infringing’ party is free not to ratify the treaty, ‘the advantages that may be gained from 
invoking the responsibility of the wrongdoing state must be balanced against the risk of 
deterring that state from ratifying the treaty’ and, thus, such claims are rare in practice.120 
The preparatory works of Article 18 of the VCLT provide interesting insights with regard to 
the possibility of extending the obligation not to frustrate the object and purpose of a treaty 
into the negotiating period. In 1959 Special Rapporteur (SR) Fitzmaurice proposed a draft 
article providing for a limited duty to negotiate in good faith: 
1. Participation in a negotiation or an international conference, even where texts have been adopted by 
unanimity, does not involve any obligation to accept the text or to carry out its provisions. 
2. This does not, however, affect such obligations as any participant in the negotiation may have 
according to general principles of international law to refrain for the time being from taking any action 
that might frustrate or adversely affect the purpose of the negotiation, or prevent the treaty producing its 
intended effect if an when it comes into force.
121
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Paragraph 2 of the proposed article did not aim to create a new legal principle but merely 
recognised possible obligations under the general principles of international law.
122
 In 1962 
SR Waldock proposed a provision on negotiation. By only listing different possible fora for 
the drawing up of a treaty text, the provision was rather descriptive than normative and did 
not make it to the VCLT:
123
 
A treaty is drawn up by a process of negotiation which may take place either through the diplomatic 
channel or some other agreed channel, or at meetings of representatives or at an international 
conference. In the case of treaties negotiated under the auspices of an international organization, the 
treaty may be drawn up either at an international conference or in some organ of the organization 
itself.
124
 
In SR Waldock’s first report in 1962, the obligation was to arise also upon the adoption of the 
treaty text and the Drafting Committee extended it to States that had only entered into 
negotiations.
125
 Thus, the 1962 Draft Article 17(1) and 1966 Draft Article 15(a)
126
 included an 
obligation to negotiate treaties in good faith.
127
 Some States supported this proposal arguing 
that good faith should guide every stage of treaty making.
128
 However, many states opposed 
the obligation as having no supportive basis in international doctrine, case law, or practice,
129
 
and a proposal to delete it was adopted by roll-call vote by 50 to 33 with 11 abstentions.
130
   
T. Hassan suggests that the States did not so much deny the substance of good faith in 
negotiations but only its formulation.
131
 Lack of an express treaty norm does not preclude 
imposing substantive obligations on negotiating States by customary international law or by 
general principles of law, such as the principles of good faith and prohibition of abuse of 
rights, applicable to the relations between States.
132
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According to Article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT, subsequent practice, together with the context, in 
the application of the treaty is taken into account when interpreting the treaty. However, 
interpreting Article 18 of the VCLT as including an obligation to negotiate in good faith in the 
sense that States are prohibited from defeating the object and purpose of a treaty during 
negotiations would contradict the original wording and the intentions of the parties to the 
VCLT and would amount to an amendment of the treaty.
133
 The opposition of States 
demonstrates a lack of customary international law basis for an obligation to negotiate treaties 
in good faith at least at the time of the adoption of the VCLT, either by way of lack of 
consistent state practice and/or opinio juris.
134
 Subsequent practice is, nevertheless, relevant 
in analysing the emergence of a rule of customary international law in subsection 1.2.3. The 
preceding analysis supports the sub-hypothesis that in international treaty law the obligation 
to negotiate in good faith is regulated to a limited extent. 
1.2.2 Pacta de Negotiando in the International Jurisprudence 
Pactum de negotiando means an agreement to negotiate a treaty and is to be distinguished 
from pactum de contrahendo, i.e. agreement to conclude a treaty.
135
 An agreement to 
negotiate a treaty must be carried out in good faith.
136
 This stems directly from Article 26 of 
the VCLT which requires performance of treaties in good faith.
137
 In some areas of 
international law the obligation to negotiate is inherent in the specific regime, e.g. maritime 
delimitation. The duty of good faith is also implicit in the obligation to settle disputes 
peacefully, e.g. by resorting to consensual negotiations. Thus, the meaning given to the 
obligation to negotiate in good faith is applicable both to pacta de negotiando and in the 
dispute settlement context. The following examples illustrate how the international courts 
have substantiated the obligation. 
In the Tacna-Arica arbitration it was under issue whether Chile had breached its obligation to 
negotiate in good faith a protocol for the plebiscite that was to decide by popular vote whether 
the territory of the provinces of Tacna and Arica is to remain definitely under the dominion 
and sovereignty of Chile or is to continue to constitute a part of Peru. The arbitral tribunal 
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stated that breaching the obligation to negotiate in good faith requires something more ‘than 
the failure of particular negotiations or the failure to ratify particular protocols’ such as a 
wilful/arbitrary refusal to proceed with negotiations or intent to prevent any reasonable 
agreement.
138
 A wilful/or arbitrary refusal to proceed with negotiations would necessarily 
amount to an abuse of rights and a breach of good faith. 
The first case where the PCIJ had to deal with the obligation to negotiate in good faith was in 
the Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland Advisory Opinion concerning a pactum de 
negotiando emanating from a Council of the League of Nations resolution adopted with the 
concurrence of Lithuania and Poland.
139
 It recommended the two Governments to enter into 
direct negotiations ‘to establish such relations between the two neighbouring States as would 
ensure the good understanding on which peace depends’.140 The negotiations, however, were 
fruitless regarding the re-establishment of the railway communication on the Landwarow-
Kaisiadorys railway sector. In the advisory opinion the PCIJ considered that the engagement 
‘is not only to enter into negotiations, but also to pursue them as far as possible, with a view 
to concluding agreements. […] But an obligation to negotiate does not imply an obligation to 
reach an agreement.’141 While the PCIJ makes no mention of good faith, P. B. Quagliato 
argues, and the author of the master thesis agrees, that the requirement to pursue negotiations 
‘with a view to concluding agreements’ is a good faith standard.142 
Agreements to negotiate were also considered by the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf 
cases. The Special Agreements between Denmark and Germany and the Netherlands and 
Germany for the submission to the Court of a difference concerning the principles and rules of 
international law applicable to the delimitation of the continental shelf in the North Sea 
provided in Article 1(2) that the continental shelf shall be delimited in the North Sea ‘by 
agreement in pursuance of the decision requested from the International Court of Justice.’143 
ICJ held to that regard that 
the parties are under an obligation to enter into negotiations with a view to arriving at an agreement, and 
not merely to go through a formal process of negotiation as a sort of prior condition for the automatic 
application of a certain method of delimitation in the absence of agreement; they are under an obligation 
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so to conduct themselves that the negotiations are meaningful, which will not be the case when either of 
them insists upon its own position without contemplating any modification of it.
144
 
Before seeking guidance from the ICJ, negotiations between the parties had failed because 
they had insisted upon their own positions without contemplating any modification. The ICJ 
noted that the parties had not satisfied the conditions which are quoted above. Thus, 
governments should be willing to and in some circumstances are required to compromise in 
negotiations.
145
 While the ICJ again made no mention of good faith, willingness to 
compromise necessarily amounts to good faith conduct, as lack of it would be an abuse of 
rights. 
Moreover, maritime delimitation, including delimitation of continental shelf, is an area of 
international law where there is no room for unilateral delimitation and, thus, the obligation to 
negotiate is inherent in the regime of maritime delimitation.
146
 Hence, the obligation to 
negotiate protects other States from one State’s abuse of rights. For example, in the Gulf of 
Maine case the ICJ emphasised that the parties were under a duty to negotiate ‘in good faith, 
with a genuine intention to achieve a positive result.’147 Interpreting its decision in 
Continental Shelf (Tunisia v Libya) the ICJ held that the relevant Special Agreement is a 
pactum de contrahendo by which the parties had undertaken to conclude a treaty and, thus, 
the obligation to conduct negotiations in a meaningful way is even stronger.
148
  
A treaty-based obligation to negotiate delimitation of continental shelf is contained in Articles 
76 and 83 of the UNCLOS.
149
 Article 83(3) of the UNCLOS also provides that pending 
agreement ‘the States concerned, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make 
every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during this 
transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement.’ This 
language clearly reflects the obligation of the concerned States to negotiate in good faith. 
Similarly to maritime delimitation, in the international fisheries law, the obligation to 
negotiate derives implicitly from the compelling need of conservation. The ICJ in the 
Fisheries Jurisdiction case stated that States are obliged to examine not unilaterally but 
                                                 
144
 North Sea Continental Shelf, para 85(a). 
145
 Quagliato, p 221. 
146
 North Sea Continental Shelf, para 47. See also Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 
Judgment, ICJ Reports 1982, p 18 (hereinafter Continental Shelf (Tunisia v Libya), para 87; Wellens, p 25. 
147
 Gulf of Maine, paras 87, 112(1). 
148
 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) Interpretation of Judgment, ICJ Reports 1985, p 192 (hereinafter 
Continental Shelf (Tunisia v Libya) Interpretation), paras 48 and 67. 
149
 See e.g. Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria: Equatorial 
Guinea intervening), Judgement, ICJ Reports 2002, p 303, para 26(5)(b). 
27 
 
together the necessary measures to be adopted.
150
 Further, the exercise of preferential rights 
implicitly requires that the extent of such rights is defined or delimited via negotiations,
151
  
conducted on the basis that ‘each must in good faith pay reasonable regard to the legal rights 
of the other’.152 Disregarding the legal rights of the other would contradict with the principle 
of the protection of legitimate interests and would also amount to an abuse of rights. 
In the same vein, the conflicting interests aroused by the industrial use of international rivers 
must be reconciled by mutual concessions embodied in a comprehensive agreement as in such 
cases a State cannot unilaterally decide whether its actions affect another State's interests. 
Thus, in the Lake Lanoux arbitration the arbitral tribunal held that there is an obligation to 
seek to enter into agreements, the potentially affected party has a right to information on 
proposals, and that ‘[c]onsultations and negotiations between the two States must be genuine, 
must comply with the rules of good faith and must not be mere formalities.’153  
In the words of the arbitral tribunal, the obligation to ‘strive to conclude’ agreement further 
entails ‘an obligation to accept in good faith all communications and contacts which could, by 
a broad comparison of interests and by reciprocal good will, provide States with the best 
conditions for concluding agreements’.154 Further, it encompasses taking into consideration 
the various interests involved giving them ‘every satisfaction compatible with the pursuit of 
its own interests’ and showing that ‘in this regard it is genuinely concerned to reconcile the 
interests of the other riparian State with its own.’155 The arbitral tribunal also brought out 
examples when negotiations would fail to comply with these rules: 
sanctions can be applied in the event, for example, of an unjustified breaking off of the discussions, 
abnormal delay, disregard of the agreed procedures, systematic refusals to take into consideration 
adverse proposals or interests, and, more generally, in cases of violation of the rules of good faith.
156
 
These are clearly examples of abuse of rights. In similar language, the Kuwait-Aminoil 
arbitration tribunal explained that the general principles of good faith that must be observed 
during negotiations include the ‘sustained upkeep of the negotiations over a period 
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appropriate to the circumstances;
157
 awareness of the interests of the other party; and a 
persevering quest for an acceptable compromise.’158 
It is important to distinguish agreements to negotiate from agreements to agree. The arbitral 
tribunal in the German External Debts arbitration analysed at length, by making reference 
also to the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, an undertaking to negotiate a dispute relating to 
claims of Greece arising out of the Mixed Graeco-German arbitral tribunal’s determination of 
World War I claims against Germany.
159
 The pactum de negotiando derived from Article 
19(1)(a) of the London Agreement on German External Debts coupled with paragraph 11 of 
its Annex I. The latter provides that the preliminary exchange of views should be followed by 
‘further discussions’ resulting, depending on approval, in the Intergovernmental Agreement. 
The Tribunal distinguished the agreement from a pactum de contrahendo, and stated that:  
a pactum de negotiando is also not without legal consequences. It means that both sides would make an 
effort, in good faith, to bring about a mutually satisfactory solution by way of a compromise, even if 
that meant the relinquishment of strongly held positions earlier taken. It implies a willingness for the 
purpose of negotiation to abandon earlier positions and to meet the other side part way. [---] [It] 
involves an understanding to deal with the other side with a view to coming to terms. [---] the Tribunal 
does not conclude that [it] absolutely obligates either side to reach an agreement, [---] [but] require[s] 
the parties to negotiate, bargain, and in good faith attempt to reach a result acceptable to both parties 
and thus bring an end to this long drawn out controversy.
160
 
Thus, the arbitral tribunal emphasised the obligation upon the negotiating parties to make a 
good faith effort and compromise with a view to reaching an agreement,
161
 i.e. to refrain from 
an abuse of rights. A genuine effort to negotiate implies that parties have to realise that 
achievement of even nearly full satisfaction is unlikely and it is important that ‘“the 
irreducible objectives” – the identification of which may require “several rounds of 
consideration” – “should not be incompatible”.’162 
Pacta de negotiando are common in treaties seeking to eliminate weapons of mass 
destruction. As an example, Article VI of the 1968 NPT imposes upon the parties an 
obligation to negotiate in good faith: 
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Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures 
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a 
treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. 
Similarly, Article IX of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention obliges states to continue 
negotiations for a treaty on chemical weapons.
163
 It is reasonable to state that the obligation to 
negotiate in good faith imposed by these provisions is to be conceptualised in the same 
manner as the international courts have done, i.e. that States are to conduct negotiations in a 
meaningful way being willing to compromise and with a view to reaching an agreement.
164
 
 The ICJ in its Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion has gone even further by unanimously 
considering Article VI of the NPT a pactum de contrahendo: 
The legal import of that obligation goes beyond that of a mere obligation of conduct; the obligation 
involved here is an obligation to achieve a precise result - nuclear disarmament in all its aspects - by 
adopting a particular course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on the matter in good 
faith.
165
 
The ICJ’s conclusion is somewhat surprising as the international jurisprudence has been 
reluctant to impose an obligation of result.
166
 Arguments have been advanced in favour and 
against the ICJ’s decision.167 Perhaps the ICJ was at pains being unable to rule out the legality 
of possessing nuclear weapons under international law
168
 and was, thus, trying to push the 
States to conclude a treaty to that regard. The object of Article VI, supported by the preamble 
of the NPT, is complete nuclear disarmament. Nevertheless, the details of such a treaty need 
to be negotiated in good faith. The author of the master thesis recalls the ICJ’s interpretation 
of the decision in Continental Shelf (Tunisia v Libya) that in the case of a pactum de 
contrahendo the obligation to conduct negotiations in a meaningful way is even stronger.
169
 If 
upheld by the Court, it could create a nuclear disarmament obligation under the auspices of 
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Article VI NPT.
170
 To date, there is no agreement on complete nuclear disarmament. 
Therefore, a possible breach of Article VI of the NPT is analysed in section 3.3 to illustrate 
the consequences. 
The duty to negotiate in not limited to provisions including the negotiations language. In Pulp 
Mills, the ICJ stated that the mechanism of co-operation as agreed between the States is 
governed by the principle of good faith, recalling that trust and confidence are inherent in 
international co-operation.
171
 The ICJ further reaffirmed that negotiations must be conducted 
in a meaningful way but there is no obligation to reach an agreement.
172
 The duty to co-
operate entails ‘first a duty to consult in good faith and then later on “to negotiate the various 
arrangements needed.”’173 Ignorance of the obligation to co-operate amounting to an abuse of 
right is in breach of a duty to act in good faith.
174
 
In the dispute settlement context regarding compromissory clauses requiring negotiations as a 
precondition for the jurisdiction, the ICJ has held that ‘negotiations must relate to the subject 
matter of the treaty’, i.e. ‘concern the substantive obligations contained in the treaty in 
question’.175 Such negotiations require at the very least ‘a genuine attempt by one of the 
disputing parties to engage in discussions with the other disputing party, with a view to 
resolving the dispute’, thus, emphasising the importance of starting negotiations.176 
In the Interim Accord case, the ICJ reaffirmed the meaning of negotiations ‘for the purposes 
of dispute settlement, or the obligation to negotiate’ as clarified through the jurisprudence of 
the ICJ and of its predecessor PCIJ, as well as arbitral awards.
177
 It is useful to reproduce the 
list provided therein. The obligation to negotiate requires States: 
1) to enter into negotiations and also to pursue them as far as possible, with a view to 
concluding agreements but with no obligation to reach an agreement;
178
  
2) to pursue lengthy negotiations of necessity;179 
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3) to conduct themselves so that the ‘negotiations are meaningful’, i.e.  not to insist ‘upon 
its own position without contemplating any modification of it’180 and not to obstruct 
negotiations, for example, by interrupting communications or causing delays in an 
unjustified manner or disregarding the procedures agreed upon;
181
  
4) to pay reasonable regard to the interests of the other.182 
The ICJ also noted that the duty to negotiate in good faith need not even be express
183
 as it is 
‘firmly rooted in general international law’184 and, thus, may be implicit in a particular 
provision on negotiations between the States.
185
 The approach of the ICJ is in keeping with 
Article 26 of the VCLT. Hence, good faith also applies, for example, to obligations to 
undertake negotiations on arms control.
186
 
Action not in good faith is a breach of a general international law obligation, even if it is a 
breach which is hard to establish and whose consequences may be uncertain.
187
 There is a 
presumption in favour of good faith.
188
 The proof required for finding the existence of bad 
faith requires more than the failure of particular negotiations.
189
 The required proof may be 
supplied by circumstantial evidence; however, it must be indisputable and convincing as to 
the intent to prevent any reasonable agreement.
190
 Whether and what consequences could 
follow a breach of an express or implicit obligation to negotiate in good faith are discussed in 
the third chapter of the master thesis. 
1.2.3 Obligation to Negotiate in Good Faith in Customary International Law 
This subsection aims to comment upon the potential customary law status of the VCLT 
grounds invalidating consent as discussed in subsection 1.2.1.1 and to analyse further 
indications of the evolution of the obligation to negotiate in good faith into a norm of 
customary international law. 
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The establishment of a rule of customary international law requires uniform and consistent 
State practice and States’ opinio juris sive necessitatis, i.e. acceptance of State practice as 
law.
191
 State practice includes any acts, statements, other behaviour, and even inaction of a 
State disclosing its recognition of a customary rule.
192
 The International Law Commission 
(ILC) has listed as evidence of customary international law: ‘treaties, decisions of national 
and international courts, national legislation, diplomatic correspondence, opinions of national 
legal advisers, practice of international organizations.’193 Opinio juris sive necessitatis is a 
State’s conviction of being under a legal obligation to act in a certain way or otherwise be 
subjected to a sanction.
194
 
State Practice 
It would be an overwhelming task to assess the conduct of the States in the process of each 
and every treaty negotiation. States’ abstention from bad faith conduct in their treaty 
negotiations necessarily is positive state practice; however, it does not offer any guidance 
whether States perceive the good faith as a moral or legal obligation. Thus, the conduct of 
States is to be assessed upon deviations from good faith conduct that are publicly not tolerated 
by States. However, allegations of bad faith are rather rare and there might be several reasons 
for this. Allegations of bad faith are difficult to prove. Thus, the opinio juris of States as 
evidenced in treaties and in the practice of international organisations, e.g. the UNGA 
resolutions, is of utmost importance when establishing the customary international law status 
of a legal obligation to negotiate in good faith. 
While the VCLT largely reflects customary international law, opinions diverge whether this is 
so with regard to the grounds of invalidity listed in Articles 49-52 of the VCLT. It is accepted 
that coercion of a State by the threat or use of force (VCLT Article 52), which reaffirms the 
prohibition in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, reflects customary international law.
195
 
Coercion of a State representative (VCLT Article 51), on the other hand, is considered to 
reflect customary international law by T. Rensmann but not by J. Klabbers.
196
  
T. Rensmann and J. Klabbers find it unlikely that fraud (VCLT Article 49) and corruption 
(VCLT Article 50) reflect customary international law because conclusive international 
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practice is lacking.
197
 However, the opposite is proposed by M. E. Villiger.
198
 J. Klabbers 
admits that the scarcity of practice might result from a reluctance to publicly admit being 
defrauded or coerced.
199
 In addition, the author of the master thesis emphasises that the 
States’ abstention from such bad faith conduct in their treaty negotiations is a factor 
contributing to the emergence of customary international law. While there is doubt as to the 
customary international law status of the articles on fraud and corruption,
200
 T. Rensmann 
suggests that these concepts are expressions of general principles of law recognised by 
civilised nations.
201
 
While Article 18 of the VCLT is accepted to reflect customary international law,
202
 the 
opposition of States to the 1966 Draft Article 15(a) demonstrates a lack of customary 
international law basis for an obligation to negotiate treaties in good faith at least at the time 
of the adoption of the VCLT due to lack of consistent State practice and opinio juris.
203
 
After the adoption of the VCLT, certain patterns of good faith State behaviour are continually 
emphasised and detailed in the practice of the international courts as discussed in subsection 
1.2.2 of the master thesis. For example, the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the 1972 
German External Debts case, the 1974 Fisheries Jurisdiction case, the 1982 Kuwait-Aminoil 
Arbitration, the 1982 and 1984 Continental Shelf cases, the 1984 Gulf of Maine case, and the 
1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion. 
The following examples evidence State practice. M. E. Villiger brings out the 1979 call of the 
Netherlands Government to the UN Secretary General for establishing, on the basis of good 
faith and Article 18 of the VCLT, a ‘“semi-commitment” of States to shorten the period 
between adoption and ratification of a treaty text’204 and the 1981 observation by the 
Norwegian ambassador, by analogy with Article 18 of the VCLT, that ‘renunciation of parts 
of the package deal leading to the LoS Convention would defeat the object and purpose of the 
1973 UNCLOS III gentleman’s agreement on which the package was established.’205 
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The existence of State practice has also been confirmed in 1999, when the UNGA adopted 
Resolution 53/101 ‘Principles and guidelines for international negotiations’, which affirms 
that ‘[n]egotiations should be conducted in good faith’ and that ‘States should endeavour to 
maintain a constructive atmosphere during negotiations and to refrain from any conduct 
which might undermine the negotiations and their progress’.206  The latter point is in its 
wording similar to the drafts of Article 18 of the VCLT. Thus, the negotiating States should 
also not prejudice the execution of the envisaged treaty, e.g. by frustrating its object and 
purpose.
207
 However, UNGA resolutions are not binding in their nature as Articles 10-14 of 
the UN Charter allow the UNGA only to make recommendations.
208
 The title of the resolution 
refers to principles and guidelines, which generally are of secondary or non-binding character, 
respectively. The wording of the resolution also refers to the soft law character of the 
resolution by recognising that the resolution ‘could’ rather than ‘shall’ offer a general, non-
exhaustive frame of reference for negotiations.
209
 
Opinio Juris 
The ICJ has accepted that UNGA resolutions can be regarded as evidence for the existence of 
opinio juris.
210
 It has been argued that unanimously adopted UNGA resolutions reflect a 
communis opinio juris sufficient to instantly form customary law.
211
 Therefore, UNGA 
resolutions are often taken as a starting point for the process of customary international law.
212
 
However, A. Pellet argues that opinio juris can only occur after the constitutive State 
practice.
213
 Nevertheless, the legal value of the UNGA resolutions must be assessed in light of 
all the circumstances and in the context of a wider framework of legal rules.
214
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The UNGA resolution ‘Principles and guidelines for international negotiations’ (hereinafter 
the Resolution) was adopted without a vote, i.e. by consensus.
215
 It is generally recognised 
that the value of UNGA’s declarations of principles as elements in the formative practice of 
customary law is higher when they are adopted by unanimity or by consensus compared to 
other methods of decision making.
216
 On the other hand, it has been argued that this is not 
necessarily the case in the United Nations.
217
 The value of consensus is lower than unanimity, 
especially if States add inconsistent statements or reservations,
218
 because consensus gives 
only one indication as to a communis opinio juris and, thus, it is not sufficient for the instant 
emergence of customary international law.
219
 Moreover, it is argued that due to the lack of 
voting record, consensus impoverishes State practice, which might result in prolonging the 
formation of customary international law.
220
 No statements or reservations were made to the 
Resolution. Thus, it has contributed to the development of customary international law. 
The legal value of UNGA resolutions must be assessed in the context of a wider framework of 
legal rules. In Article 1 of the Resolution, the UNGA reaffirms principles of international law 
relevant to international negotiations. These include the principle of sovereign equality of all 
States, duty of non-intervention in domestic matters, (p)acta sunt servanda rule, prohibition 
of the threat or use of force and the invalidating effect coercion on treaties, duty to cooperate 
in international relations, and duty to settle disputes peacefully. These principles derive 
already from the UN Charter and also reflect customary international law. Thus, on the one 
hand, it can be argued that the customary nature of these principles of international law spills 
over to the obligation to negotiate in good faith in international law. On the other hand, the 
guidelines for negotiations, the identification of which aims to enhance the predictability of 
the negotiating States, are affirmed by the UNGA. Thus, the Resolution rather develops than 
codifies international law regarding negotiations.
221
 Nevertheless, the consensual adoption of 
the resolution gives at least one indication of a communis opinio juris and is, thus, relevant 
with regard to the formation of customary international law.
222
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The guidelines listed after the obligation to ‘conduct negotiations in good faith’ are reflective 
of the international jurisprudence on the obligation to negotiate in good faith. For example, 
States should take due account of the importance of engaging in international negotiations 
States whose vital interests are directly affected, which is in keeping with the obligation to 
consider the rights and interests of others as expressed e.g. in the Fisheries Jurisdiction and  
Lake Lanoux cases.
223
 Further, States’ obligations to ‘facilitate the pursuit or conclusion of 
negotiations by remaining focused throughout on the main objectives of the negotiations’224 
and to ‘use their best endeavours to continue to work towards a mutually acceptable and just 
solution in the event of an impasse in negotiations’225 are reflective of the international 
jurisprudence’s standard of conducting negotiations in good faith ‘with a view to reaching 
agreement’226 and being willing to compromise.227 The obligation of States to ‘adhere to the 
mutually agreed framework for conducting negotiations’ stems from the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda. 
Affirmative Judicial Practice 
The practice of the international courts following the adoption of the Resolution further 
supports the customary international law status of the obligation to negotiate in good faith. 
The 2010 Pulp Mills case applied the good faith standard to a co-operation mechanism and 
the 2011 Interim Accord case emphasised that the good faith requirement need not be express 
in agreements to negotiate. The meaning given to good faith conduct is continuously specified 
in the international jurisprudence. In 2014 in Timor-Leste v Australia, a case related to the 
pending proceedings in the PCA, Timor-Leste argued that ‘[t]he seizure and detention of 
documents and data allegedly relating to one party’s positions and strategies regarding a 
future process of negotiations “manifestly distorts the character” of this process by placing 
that party “at a considerable negotiating disadvantage”’.228 The ICJ found Australia’s conduct 
to violate Timor-Leste’s sovereignty and ordered Australia, as a provisional measure, not to  
interfere in any way in communications between Timor-Leste and its legal advisers in connection with 
the pending Arbitration under the Timor Sea Treaty of 20 May 2002 between Timor-Leste and 
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Australia, with any future bilateral negotiations concerning maritime delimitation, or with any other 
related procedure between the two States, including the present case before the Court.
229
 
While the ICJ made no mention of good faith, the principle of sovereignty is relevant to good 
faith international negotiations.
230
 Thus, good faith negotiations also require not interfering in 
any way in a State’s communications with its legal advisers. The exact content of the 
obligation to negotiate in good faith depends on the circumstances of each particular case.
231
 
Since over a long period of time no State has expressly or implicitly disclosed its 
dissatisfaction with the rule on the obligation to negotiate in good faith as emerging in the 
international jurisprudence or as expressed in the Resolution, such qualified silence has 
contributed towards the formation of customary international law
232
 and can be construed as 
acquiescence on which other States may come to rely.
233
 Thus, in light of all the 
circumstances and the context of a wider framework of legal rules, the author of the master 
thesis is of the opinion that the obligation to negotiate in good faith in the Resolution is an 
obligation of customary international law and, thus, the relevant sub-hypothesis has found 
support. 
1.3 The Applicability of the Principle of Good Faith to All International Negotiations  
It has been confirmed in the previous sections that obligations to negotiate having a general 
international law or conventional basis must be conducted in good faith. Undoubtedly, good 
faith behaviour during international negotiations is naturally expected from States, and the 
principle of good faith applies to all negotiations as a moral standard. However, the author of 
the master thesis argues that the obligation to negotiate in good faith applies to all 
negotiations, including negotiations undertaken voluntarily.
234
 This obligation is not merely a 
moral one but a legal one, the breach of which entails legal consequences. 
M. A. Rogoff has argued without much analysis that good faith is ‘a normative and general 
principle of international law’ which ‘presumably also applies to all dealings between 
States’235 and, thus, acts as a presumption and requirement for both the negotiation process 
and the performance of the reached agreement.
236
 R. Kolb argues that good faith is 
                                                 
229
 Timor-Leste v Australia, para 55. 
230
 UNGA Res 53/101 (20 January 1999) UN Doc A/RES/53/101, para 1. 
231
 Wellens, p 40; Hassan, p 480. 
232
 Villiger 1985, p 19. 
233
 Ibid; Shaw, p 89; Gulf of Maine, para 130. 
234
 See also Hassan, pp 444, 479; Wellens, p 23. 
235
 Rogoff, p 147 (emphasis added). 
236
 Wellens, p 43. 
38 
 
‘consubstantial with the idea of negotiations’.237 According to J. F. O’Connor, the principle of 
good faith is ‘relevant in the negotiation of treaties, in so far as normal rules, such as estoppel, 
may not be applicable.’238 Since there is no existing general obligation to negotiate in 
international law, the author of the master thesis finds there to be a dilemma whether the 
principle of good faith could apply to all negotiations.  
Negotiations are consensual in character. States have the right to negotiate but they must not 
abuse that right. Thus, even when negotiating parties have not concluded and do not conclude 
an express agreement to negotiate or regulate the framework for their negotiations, the States’ 
conduct and exchange of communications eventually culminate in an implied agreement to 
negotiate to which the principle of good faith should apply. Moreover, negotiations, in 
particular for norm-creative treaties, are not always started in order to settle existing disputes. 
Naturally, competing interests may and do arise during negotiations but it would be 
unreasonable to let a dispute crystallise for the principle of good faith to apply.  
Substantive obligations on negotiating States can be imposed by customary international law 
or by general principles of law, such as the principles of good faith and prohibition of abuse 
of rights,
239
 applicable to the relations between States.
240
 It has been argued in section 1.2.3 
that the Resolution is of customary international law character and the guidelines, in essence, 
specify the doctrine of abuse of rights. Neither the Resolution’s title nor content are limited to 
the obligation to settle disputes peacefully and in good faith. International negotiations are 
also seen as a flexible, constructive, and effective means for the management of international 
relations and for the creation of new international norms of conduct of States.
241
 The ICJ has 
in the Nuclear Tests cases stated that the principle of good faith governs both the ‘creation 
and performance of legal obligations, whatever their source’.242 Thus, the guidelines and 
principles in the Resolution apply to all negotiations. 
The case law of the international judiciary supports the conclusion. In German External Debts 
the arbitral tribunal emphasised that a State’s adherence to its previous stand and insisting 
upon the complete capitulation of the other side would be inconsistent with the term 
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‘negotiation’.243 Thus, in all negotiations States should be willing to compromise. In the North 
Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ noted that the obligation to negotiate in a meaningful way 
‘merely constitutes a special application of a principle which underlies all international 
relations, and which is moreover recognized in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations 
as one of the methods for the peaceful settlement of international disputes.’244 Thus, the ICJ 
implied that in all international relations, including international negotiations in general, the 
parties should conduct themselves in accordance with the principle of good faith. 
Furthermore, the applicability of the principle of good faith to all international negotiations is 
demanded by the interests of international peace.
245
 The tribunal in the German External Debt 
arbitration emphasised the desirability in international relations of reaching a positive 
satisfactory and equitable result to ensure peace and the well-being of the community and to 
avoid incalculable harm.
246
 In any and all negotiations conflicts may arise and it would be 
unreasonable to let those crystallise into disputes for the principle of good faith to apply. 
Thus, it is desirable that there is an obligation to conduct all negotiations in good faith in 
international law. Lending the words from H. Thirlway, ‘to negotiate otherwise than in good 
faith is surely not to negotiate at all.’247 
Requirements of Negotiations in Good Faith 
Negotiations aiming at the codification of international law or norm creation are similar to 
negotiations for the peaceful settlement of disputes. However, according to K. Wellens, the 
latter might be subject to more rigid conditions that the ICJ has determined with regard to ‘the 
proper conduct of negotiations in general’ and which have become classical now.248 The 
author of the master thesis is of the opinion that the conditions for the negotiations are the 
same with few exceptions. While pacta de negotiando, and moreover, pacta de contrahendo, 
whether having a general international law or conventional basis, require starting negotiations 
with honesty and sincerity,
249
 there is in general international law no obligation to enter into 
negotiations. However, once they have started, they must be conducted in good faith. 
Negotiations in good faith require: 
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i. conducting them without engaging in fraudulent, corruptive, or coercive conduct 
(VCLT Article 49-52);
250
 
ii. refraining from acts which would frustrate the purposes of the negotiations;251 
iii. refraining from abuse of rights and conducting negotiations in a loyal and meaningful 
way and making genuine serious efforts
252
 with a view to arriving at an agreement
253
 
and not merely going through a formal process,
254
 i.e. 
a. not asserting excessive claims by abusing a higher bargaining power;255 
b. seriously considering other State’s proposals/interests/rights;256 
c. compromising, i.e. making mutual concessions;257 
d. not hiding behind equivocal formulations in order later to benefit from the 
text’s ambiguity;258 
e. avoiding causing disproportionate inconveniences and harm to the other 
State;
259
 
f. not obstructing negotiations, e.g. by interrupting communications or causing 
delays in an unjustified manner or disregarding the procedures agreed upon;
260
 
g. not exercising discretion arbitrarily;261 
h. avoiding movements and reversals of positions;262 
i. not abandoning the process prematurely;263 
iv. furthering negotiations in case of deadlock.264 
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In contrast to negotiations in the dispute settlement context where good faith requires resort to 
other means of settlement in case negotiations fail,
265
 there is no real alternative means for 
norm-creation and the negotiating parties are rarely obligated to reach an agreement. 
In conclusion, the author argues that States have an obligation to negotiate in good faith, 
whether the obligation to negotiate has a general international law or conventional basis or 
even if the negotiations have been undertaken voluntarily. Hence, the sub-hypothesis that the 
obligation to negotiate in good faith is applicable to all negotiations between States is 
confirmed. The content of the obligation to negotiate in good faith varies depending on the 
circumstances of each case and has been exemplified above by reference to international 
jurisprudence and academic literature. A breach of the obligation to negotiate in good faith 
entails legal consequences as outlined and discussed in chapter 3 of the master thesis. 
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2 OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH AS A GENERAL 
PRINCIPLE OF LAW RECOGNISED BY CIVILISED NATIONS 
This chapter of the master thesis aims to complete the analysis of international law and to 
establish whether the obligation to negotiate in good faith derives from domestic legal 
systems as a general principle of law recognised by civilised
266
 nations. M. A. Rogoff 
suggests that the international application of the doctrine of pre-contractual liability/culpa in 
contrahendo is supported as the doctrine is recognised in many domestic legal systems as a 
general principle of law.
267
 
The different sets of international and regional model rules, although not binding, such as the 
UNIDROIT Principles on International Commercial Contracts (PICC),
268
 the Principles of 
European Contract Law (PECL),
269
 and the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR)
270
 
aiming to bring out the common core and to harmonise the law on commercial contracts seem 
to support M. A. Rogoff’s position. However, there appears to be a civil law and common law 
divide, which is also apparent from the preparatory works of the 1980 United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG).
271
  
Thus, a closer inspection of the domestic laws is warranted and a comparative analysis of the 
regulation of pre-contractual liability in the civil law and common law undertaken. It will be 
argued that, in general, both civil and common law legal systems – English law somewhat 
more reluctantly
272
 and Australian law a bit hesitantly – recognise the principle of good faith 
contractual performance.
273
 However, in contrast to civil law, common law shows reluctance 
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to recognise a general pre-contractual duty of good faith absent an express and clear 
agreement between the parties to that regard. 
2.1 Nature and Derivation of General Principles of Law 
There is some debate whether Article 38(1)(c) includes general principles of international law, 
principles applicable to all legal systems, and principles of legal logic or whether they just 
reflect customary international or treaty law.
274
 For example, the ICJ has used Article 38(1)(c) 
of the ICJ Statute and referred among others to principles of estoppel or acquiescence, abuse 
of rights, and good faith,
275
 which can rather be classified as general principles of 
international law. The ICJ has based no decisions explicitly upon Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ 
Statute.
276
 Similarly to A. Pellet, the author restricts the scope of Article 38(1)(c) to principles 
emanating from domestic law for the purposes of this master thesis.
277
 
According to L. F. L. Oppenheim ‘[t]he intention is to authorise the Court to apply the general 
principles of municipal jurisprudence, [in particular of private law], insofar as they are 
applicable to relations of States’.278 Thus, identifying such general principles of law involves 
1) a comparative study of national legal systems and 2) demonstrating that the relevant 
principle is transposable to the international level.
279
 Elements of other developed systems are 
chosen, modified, and adapted by international tribunals resulting in a body of international 
law of its own creation though influenced by domestic law.
280 
As such, the general principle 
of law is not only a ‘subsidiary’ source of law, a term confined to Article 38(1)(d).281  
The relevance of a general principle is that 1) it may fill lacunae in case a treaty or customary 
rule does not regulate an issue that is crucial for deciding a case;
282
 and 2) general principles 
provide guidance for the meaning of treaty stipulations that are textually open to different 
interpretations or can qualify relevant rules of international law.
283
 It is established above in 
subsection 1.2 that treaty law regulates the negotiation stage only to a limited extent. In 
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section 1.3 the author of the master thesis argues that the obligation to negotiate in good faith 
is of customary international law status. The national laws of States as evidence of state 
practice and opinio juris could further support this conclusion. In addition, the analysis 
provides an interesting and useful comparison point with regard to the content of the 
obligation to negotiate in good faith at domestic and international level. 
Concerning transposability to the international level, the obligation to negotiate treaties in 
good faith, in essence, falls into the realm of treaty law. The provisions of the VCLT on an 
error, fraud, and coercion of a state representative are inspired by domestic private laws, in 
particular, law of obligation and/or contract law. Thus, the analogy is plausible also regarding 
the obligation to negotiate in good faith. ‘[T]he relationship between equal and independent 
private actors might offer the most appropriate analogies for the relationships between 
sovereign States.’284 Nevertheless, the author acknowledges that general principles of law can 
only be identified at a high level of abstraction since the process of concluding international 
treaties is subject to a high standard of care and deliberation and differs from circumstances 
pertaining to the conclusion of private law contracts.
285
 
With regard to the comparative study of national legal systems, in order to become a general 
principle of law, good faith and the obligation to negotiate in good faith must have a 
normative basis.
286
 As Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute does not require recognition by all 
domestic legal orders, an analysis of a fair number of representative legal systems is 
sufficient.
287
 For the purposes of the master thesis, the normative basis is sought from the 
largest and most influential legal traditions, i.e. the civil law tradition and the common law 
tradition.
288
 Such division is also the basis for works of comparative contract law.
289
 The 
master thesis deals with comparative law on a micro level, i.e. compares specific legal norms 
regarding good faith and, in particular, the obligation to negotiate in good faith in legal 
systems.
290
  
Sample representative States are chosen based on K. Zweigert and H. Kötz’s macro level 
comparative law division of legal families: 1) Romanistic family, 2) Germanic family, 3) 
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Nordic family, 4) Common law family, and 5) others, such as Chinese law, Japanese law, 
Islamic Law, and Hindu Law.
291
 However, the author does not analyse the Nordic family 
separately, and as the contract law of the ‘other’ families is highly influenced by the contract 
laws of the former families, these are largely left out from the analysis. A. Pellet has opined 
that probably all modern domestic laws borrow part of their rules from civil law and common 
law and that it is ‘enough to ascertain that such principles are present in any (or some) of the 
laws belonging to these various systems’. 292 
In the civil law tradition, the most important and influential legal system in the Germanic 
family, in particular with regard to the principle of good faith, is Germany, and in the 
Romanistic family – France.293 The Netherlands is also an important example illustrating a 
shift away from the French influence to German influence regarding good faith.
294
 Additional 
remarks are made with regard to other legal systems in these families, including outside 
Europe. In the common law family, English law must be differentiated from the law of the 
US, Australia and Canada adopting intermediate positions.   
An adequate verification of general principles of law recognised by civilised nations requires 
taking into account both legislative provisions and domestic case law.
295
 It is a difficult task 
and cannot be exhaustive due to the limits of the master thesis. Therefore, for generalisations, 
the author additionally relies on secondary literature. As far as possible, the author aims to 
limit the focus of this subsection to obligations going beyond the prohibitions of fraud, 
corruption, and coercion in the negotiation process as clearly recognised in Articles 49-52 of 
the VCLT and which, as T. Rensmann suggests, are expressions of general principles of law 
recognised by civilised nations.
296
  
In general, while good faith is a vague notion also in the domestic laws of States,
297
 it has 
three types of meaning: 1) good faith as criteria of interpretation, 2) good faith as a standard 
of behaviour creating legal obligations, and 3) good faith as a protection mechanism against 
mistaken belief.
298
 The master thesis is concerned with good faith as a standard of behaviour, 
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i.e. ‘to behave loyally, sincerely, honestly; to keep one’s word; to keep one’s promise’,299 in 
particular, in the conclusion of a contract. 
2.2 Model Rules v CISG 
The non-binding model rules in PICC and PECL and the DCFR all provide for pre-
contractual duties of good faith. Article 1.7 of the PICC provides that ‘[e]ach party must act in 
accordance with good faith and fair dealing in international trade.’ Article 2.1.15 of the PICC 
prohibits negotiations in bad faith and provides that 
(1) A party is free to negotiate and is not liable for failure to reach an agreement.  
(2) However, a party who negotiates or breaks off negotiations in bad faith is liable for the losses caused 
to the other party.  
(3) It is bad faith, in particular, for a party to enter into or continue negotiations when intending not to 
reach an agreement with the other party. 
Article 2:301 (ex art. 5.301) of the PECL
300
 and Section 2 Article 3:201 of the DCFR state the 
same as Article 2.1.15 of the PICC, albeit in a slightly different wording. Each also provides 
for a duty of confidentiality: 
Where information is given as confidential by one party in the course of negotiations, the other party is 
under a duty not to disclose that information or to use it improperly for its own purposes, whether or not 
a contract is subsequently concluded. Where appropriate, the remedy for breach of that duty may 
include compensation based on the benefit received by the other party.
301
 
PECL Article 4:106 regulates liability for providing incorrect information and DCFR Section 
II Article 7:205 and Section VI Article 2:210, PECL Article 4:107, and PICC Article 3.2.5 for 
fraudulent non-disclosure of information. 
PECL was inspired by the CISG which by now has 84 parties to it. CISG, however, makes 
little reference to good faith in Article 7(1): ‘[i]n the interpretation of this Convention, regard 
is to be had to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its 
application and the observance of good faith in international trade’, and does not contain a 
provision on good faith negotiations. Thus, good faith needs to be observed in international 
commerce but does not necessarily have to govern sale and purchase.
302
 However, the 
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principle of good faith is manifested for example in CISG Article 8(2) regarding the 
reasonable person standard, Article 16(2)(b) concerning irrevocability of an offer in cases of 
reasonable reliance, which is of relevance to the pre-contractual stage, and Article 21(2) 
regarding the status of a timely dispatched acceptance that was received late.
303
 Despite 
varying interpretations, it is suggested that good faith is an underlying principle of the 
CISG.
304
 
In contrast to the model rules, CISG does not provide for pre-contractual duties of good faith. 
The draft Article 5 of CISG, which provided that ‘[i]n the course of the formation of the 
contract the parties must observe the principle of fair dealing’, was omitted in the final 
agreement as a compromise solution to resolve differences between the common law and civil 
law jurists regarding good faith.
305
 The proposal by the German Democratic Republic that the 
Convention provide for pre-contractual liability was rejected for the same reason.
306
 
Therefore, the author of the master thesis finds it necessary to obtain a better understanding of 
the civil and common law approaches to good faith and the obligation to negotiate in good 
faith in order to establish whether the obligation to negotiate in good faith could be part of 
international law as a general principle of law recognised by civilised nations.  
2.3 Civil Law Tradition 
In the civil law legal tradition, the general principle of good faith and the obligation to 
perform the contract in good faith are generally recognised. Nevertheless, good faith as a 
standard of behaviour is difficult to define and its application depends on the context of a 
particular case.
307
 In general, good faith behaviour includes duties of loyalty and honesty, 
cooperation and disclosure, and duties to consider the legitimate interests and rights of the 
other party.
308
 
Based on the principle of good faith, the civil law legal tradition also recognises the concept 
of pre-contractual liability.
309
 It has its roots in Roman law
310
 and was articulated as the 
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doctrine of culpa in contrahendo (‘fault in negotiating’) by I. von Jhering.311 I. von Jhering 
advanced the thesis that a negotiating party must be compensated for his or her reliance 
damages by the party whose culpable conduct during contract negotiations caused the 
contract’s invalidity or prevented its perfection.312 I. von Jhering’s theory aimed to protect the 
negotiating party from mistake; it was R. Saleilles who advanced the theory to cover failed 
negotiations.
313
 I. von Jhering’s ideas influenced many civil law systems, in particular, the 
German legal system.
314
 
2.3.1 German Law 
The principle of good faith (‘Treu und Glauben’) is enshrined in Article 242 of the 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB)315 requiring good faith performance of contractual 
obligations. Together with the principal obligations of any contract, the German jurist 
introduced so-called accessory obligations such as the duties of vigilance, loyalty and 
cooperation, and obligations to clarify and inform.
316
  Culpa in contrahendo extends these 
ancillary duties into the pre-contractual area.
317
 It entered the modern German law under 
cover of fictitious pre-contractual contracts, later, on the basis of a general analogy to Articles 
122, 179, and 307, 309 BGB.
318
 
The concept of culpa in contrahendo can also be seen as advanced by the German judiciary 
on the basis of Article 242 of the BGB,
319
 imposing by virtue of law on negotiating parties 
duties of protection and loyalty, which only in 2001 with the insertion of Article 311 found its 
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place in the German BGB.
320
 Article 311 BGB together with Article 241(2) BGB now 
provides that the obligation to take account of the rights, legal interests, and other interests of 
the other party comes into existence by the commencement of contract negotiations and the 
initiation of a contract. 
Interestingly, the provisions do not use the terminology of ‘good faith’.321 The statutory 
provisions must be construed with reference to the preceding case law.
322
 The negotiating 
parties are under no duty to reach an agreement.
323
 However, if negotiations are entered into 
or continued without the intention to reach an agreement or without the other party having a 
chance to bargain, the party is in breach of the duty to negotiate in good faith.
324
 Similarly, 
unjustified breaking off of negotiations where the other party legitimately expected the 
contract to be perfected breaches the duty to negotiate in good faith.
325
  
Furthermore, the duty to negotiate in good faith imposes upon the negotiating parties duties to 
provide accurate information and disclose information regarding matters of essential interest 
to the other negotiating party whom the non-disclosing party knows is not able to procure the 
information him or herself.
326
 Some pre-contractual duties may be established during 
negotiations, such as an obligation to maintain the confidentiality of certain information or an 
obligation to restrain from negotiating with a third party for a specific length of time.
327
 The 
injured negotiating party must be compensated for the damages incurred in reliance on the 
expected contract (reliance damages).
328
 
2.3.2 French Law 
In France, however, there has been a strong emphasis on the freedom of contract.
329
 R. 
Saleilles advanced the view that negotiating parties must act in good faith and refrain from 
breaking off negotiations arbitrarily without compensating the other for reliance damages.
330
 
Nevertheless, until recently there appeared to be no direct French counterpart for the German 
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culpa in contrahendo. Article 1134(3) of the French Civil Code
331
 only recognises a duty to 
perform contracts in good faith.  
The ordinance of 10 February 2016,
332
 which will become effective 1 October 2016, provides 
in the new Article 1104 that ‘[c]ontracts must be negotiated, formed and performed in good 
faith’ and specifies that this provision is a ‘public policy provision’.333 Article 1112 further 
specifies that ‘[a]ny party that conducts or terminates such negotiations wrongfully shall be 
obliged to provide compensation on the basis of extra-contractual liability.’334 In addition, 
pursuant to the new Article 1112-1 of the French Civil Code: ‘[i]f one of the parties knows 
information which is of decisive importance for the consent of the other party, he must inform 
him thereof wherever it is legitimate that the other party does not know the information or 
relies on his contracting party’.335 
These amendments seem to merely codify the current State of French law.
336
  Pre-contractual 
liability has been long recognised by the French judiciary. In Société Muroiterie Fraisse v 
Micon et Autres a French Court of Appeals noted: 
[I]t must be recognized. . . that the preliminary phase of negotiations, during which the conditions of the 
contemplated contract are studied and discussed, certain obligations of rectitude and good faith rest on 
the parties; these obligations clearly relate not to the conclusion eventual contract but to the conduct of 
negotiation themselves.
337
 
The basis for pre-contractual liability is general tortious liability for fault in Articles 1382 and 
1383 of the French Civil Code.
338
 Thereby French law reinforces the ideas of the abuse of 
rights and of contractual good faith at the stage of negotiations.
339
 In order to establish 
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liability, faulty conduct must have caused harm.
340
 The content of such pre-contractual 
liability is similar to the German culpa in contrahendo. It is wrongful to enter into or 
continue negotiations without a real intention to reach an agreement, to make 
misrepresentations, to leak confidential information, and to break off negotiations 
unexpectedly without a legitimate reason
341
.
342
 In addition, the duty of good faith imposes 
upon the negotiating parties extensive informational obligations.
343
 So far when the loss is 
certain, the wronged party is not only to be compensated fully for his or her reliance loss and 
loss of opportunity but also for wrong caused to reputation or loss caused by divulging 
confidential information.
344
 
2.3.3 Dutch Law 
The Dutch approach illustrates a shift away from the French model. In its Article 1374, the 
old Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW) used to contain a good faith provision that was based on 
Article 1134 of the French Civil Code and, like its French model, was for a long time not 
accorded much practical significance. After the First World War, the importance of its 
application grew comparable to Article 242 of the BGB. The new BW of 1992
345
 includes 
numerous provisions of good faith in Articles 6:248, 6:258, 6:2;
346
 however, substituting 
good faith with the expression of ‘reasonableness and fairness’.347 There is no provision on 
cupla in contrahendo but the doctrine has been developed in court practice and differs 
somewhat from the German and French approaches. 
In Baris/Riezenkamp,
348
 the Hoge Raad ruled that the legal relationship of negotiating parties 
was dominated by good faith requiring taking into account each other’s interests. In 
Plas/Valburg,
349
 the Hoge Raad further distinguished three stages in the negotiating process. 
At the first stage, no limitations apply to breaking off negotiations and at the second stage, 
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the party breaking off negotiations has to compensate the other party’s expenses. At the third 
stage, where it is reasonable to rely upon a contract coming into existence, the party breaking 
off negotiations is liable in damages up to expectation interest and may even be ordered to 
continue negotiations.
350
 In De Ruiterij/Ruiters,
351
 the Hoge Raad has limited the latter 
doctrine yet the principle at its extreme has been repeated.
352
 In CBB/JPO,
353
 the Hoge Raad 
recognised the parties’ freedom to break off negotiations, unless breaking off would be 
unacceptable in the specific circumstances of the case, and has created some uncertainty with 
regard to the doctrine.
354
  
The pre-contractual duty of information in Dutch law is based on the provisions of 
mistake.
355
 In addition, in Cattier v Waanders the Hoge Raad held that the duty of disclosure 
may also be infringed when a party has acted contrary to good faith.
356
 Furthermore, as 
established in Van der Beek v Van Dartel, the duty of disclosure in principle prevails over a 
duty to investigate for yourself.
357
 
Based on these sample States representative of the civil law legal tradition, the culpa in 
contrahendo doctrine requiring the parties to negotiate in good faith is generally recognised 
in the European civil law tradition, although the theoretical basis or range of application 
might differ.
358
 The content of pre-contractual duties is similar among these legal systems 
imposing upon the parties extensive informational duties, prohibiting engaging in and 
continuing negotiations without a real intention to reach an agreement, and breaking off 
negotiations without a just cause.
359
 Damages are traditionally awarded at least for reliance 
loss, i.e. negotiation expenses that were rendered futile, and loss of opportunity.
360
 The Dutch 
approach to pre-contractual liability, influenced by both the French and German approaches, 
however, is rather extreme by its willingness to award expectation damages. 
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2.3.4 Other Legal Systems of the Civil Law 
The German and French approaches have been influential worldwide. Yet, the legal adoption 
of the doctrine is a rather recent development
361
 and an ongoing process. German BGB has, 
among others, influenced the Estonian law of obligations. Article 14 of the Estonian Law of 
Obligations Act is modelled upon PICC and PECL and is much more specific than the 
relevant provisions of the German BGB.
362
 Nevertheless, its content reflects the doctrine of 
culpa in contrahendo as developed in German case law. Specific provisions on culpa in 
contrahendo can also be found, for example, in Articles 197 and 198 of the Greek Civil Code, 
Articles 1337 and 1338 Italian Civil Code, and Article 227 of the Portuguese Civil Code.
363
 
Austria and Switzerland, on the other hand, are examples of legal systems expressly 
recognising the principle of good faith but having no specific provision on pre-contractual 
liability. The doctrine has been implied from some other provisions of contract law or law of 
obligations and has, thus, found judicial and doctrinal support.
364
 Similarly, there is no 
specific legal provision in Denmark, Sweden or Norway, where the concept has found support 
through general principles of law; the courts of Denmark, however, being rather reluctant to 
award damages.
365
 Spain, recognising the principle of good faith in Article 7 of its Civil Code, 
follows the French tortious liability approach based on Article 1902 of its Civil Code.
366
 
While the culpa in contrahendo doctrine in Finland derives from German contract law, it is 
being applied independently as tortious liability providing compensation for reliance loss and 
loss of opportunity.
367
 
The influence of the German and French legal systems is evident also outside Europe. The 
Latin-American countries belong also to the civil law tradition and some of them have 
included the culpa in contrahendo doctrine in their legislation.
368
 For example, Article 422 of 
the Brazilian Civil Code provides that ‘the parties are obliged to keep in the contract 
conclusion as well as in its execution, the principles of honesty and good faith’.369 Article 863 
of the Colombian Commercial Code and Articles 689-690 of the Paraguayan Civil Code 
transcribe classical statements of the doctrine, while Article 465 of the Bolivian Civil Code 
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and Articles 990-993 of the reformed Argentinian Civil and Commercial Code contain precise 
rules on the topic. The Chilean approach by its lack of regulation and reliance on the general 
liability for fault bears resemblance to the French approach.
370
 
Some of the major players, both economically and politically, on the international plane have 
only rather recently legally adopted the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo.  
The legal system of China is based in the civil law tradition.
371
 From its first major contract 
law, the 1978 Economic Contract Law, the principles of equity and mutual benefit during 
contracting have carried over to the Uniform Contract Law (UCL)
372
 in effect from 1 October 
1999, which is modelled upon UNIDROIT PICC, CISG, and foreign legal standards.
373
 
However, good faith dealings are inherent to the Chinese culture and good faith and thereby a 
prerequisite to a contractual relationship.
374
 Article 42 of the UCL prohibits conducting 
negotiations in bad faith or with malicious intent and prevents concealment of important facts 
and presenting inaccurate information.
375
 In order to abide by the principle of good faith, the 
parties have ‘to cooperate in forming and performing a contract in order to carry out its 
purpose’ and acknowledge that ‘a court has broad powers to fill gaps in the law, interpret 
contracts according to fairness principles, and override unfair provisions in the contract.’376 
Article 43 imposes upon the parties a duty of confidentiality. The injured party has to be 
compensated for reliance costs and costs for the loss of opportunity.
377
 
In Russia Article 431.1 of the Civil Code
378
 on pre-contractual negotiations only recently, on 
1 June 2015, entered into force. The concept has so far been foreign to the Russian legal 
system and it remains to be seen how it will be applied by Russian courts.
379
 The provision 
does not impose an obligation to reach an agreement but considers as bad faith conduct 
‘providing the counterparty with incomplete or inaccurate information or non-disclosure of 
circumstances, which should have be brought to the attention of the counterparty’ and 
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‘sudden and unjustified termination of negotiations under circumstances which the other 
party could not reasonably expect.’380 It also imposes an obligation of confidentiality.381 A 
negotiating party in breach of these obligations has to compensate the counterparty for 
reliance damages and loss of opportunity to conclude a contract with a third party.
382
 
As illustrated above, the duty to negotiate in good faith has been generally recognised in the 
civil law tradition both in legal systems in Europe and outside Europe. 
2.4 Common Law Tradition 
The countries in the common law tradition are traditionally more reluctant to recognise a 
general principle of good faith underlying the concept of pre-contractual liability.
383
 In 
common law, the freedom of contract strongly prevails – the negotiating parties are at arm’s 
length, i.e. independent and equal, and free to withdraw from negotiations at any time without 
incurring liability.
384
 The principle of caveat emptor applies and negotiating parties are not 
obliged to disclose information but required to investigate themselves.
385
 Absent a special 
relationship, no obligations are imposed upon the negotiating parties until a contract has been 
formed and is enforceable.  
Contract formation elements in common law are offer, acceptance, consideration, parties’ 
intention to be bound, and certainty of contract terms. As a general rule, offers are revocable 
for lack of consideration and, thus, negotiating parties are free to withdraw from negotiations. 
Similarly, gratuitous promises are unenforceable for lack of consideration. Agreements to 
negotiate in good faith are often unenforceable due to lack of certainty.
386
 In addition, it is 
often argued that civil law codifications focus more on the subjective expectations of the 
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parties to a contract than common law, which adopts an objective literal approach to 
contracts, is accustomed to.
387
  
As will be discussed below, English law has been the most conservative regarding recognition 
of a general principle of good faith and the duty to negotiate in good faith.
388
 Other important 
common law jurisdictions, such as the USA, Australia, and Canada, are strongly influenced 
by English law. However, the US recognition of good faith performance is influenced by 
German law instead. After abolishing the right to appeal to the English Privy Council, the 
legal systems of Canada and Australia have developed more independently and adopt 
intermediary positions compared to English and US law. Nevertheless, good faith is not 
extended to contract negotiations in any of these legal systems lacking an express and clear 
agreement to that regard. 
2.4.1 English Law 
While good faith has played a role in an earlier stage of development of English law,
389
 
modern English law has not committed itself to an overriding principle of good faith and has 
denied the theory of the abuse of rights.
390
 Although the CISG includes a compromise 
solution with regard to the principle of good faith, the United Kingdom is among the States 
that have not ratified it.
391
 This exemplifies the reluctance of English law towards the 
recognition of a general principle of good faith. It is feared that the introduction of a general 
principle of good faith will create legal uncertainty, undermine the principle of contractual 
autonomy thereby reducing economic efficiency, and allow for unpredictable judicial 
discretion.
392
 Rather than accepting a general doctrine of ‘good faith’, English law ‘has 
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developed piecemeal solutions in response to demonstrated problems of unfairness’, in 
particular, rules of construction and implied terms.
393
 Whether English law’s recourse to these 
is satisfactory is a matter of dispute.
394
  
In English law, good faith and fairness or reasonableness are relevant only exceptionally.
395
 
Arguments of fairness, reasonableness, and business efficacy play an important role in 
contract construction, i.e. in the interpretation of express terms and in the implication of 
contract terms.
396
 Well-established implied terms reflecting good faith include duties of 
honesty; cooperation, which may include duties of disclosure; duty to exercise contractual 
discretionary powers honestly and in good faith; and not acting arbitrarily, capriciously, or 
unreasonably.
397
 The obligation to exercise contractual discretion in good faith was recently 
confirmed by the United Kingdom Supreme Court in British Telecommunications Plc v 
Telefonica O2 UK Ltd.
398
 
In addition, English courts have developed various legal doctrines, such as economic duress 
and frustration.
399
 While contract construction necessarily has implications to contract 
performance, good faith as a standard of behaviour is not generally implied by law but rather 
in fact. Good faith as a standard of behaviour was described in Berkeley Community Village 
by Morgan J as an ‘obligation to observe reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in 
accordance with their actions that related to the agreement and also requiring faithfulness to 
the agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectation of the other party 
to the agreement.’400  
Good faith is recognised with regard to certain specific contracts uberrimae fidei, i.e. of 
utmost good faith, such as contracts arising from fiduciary relations, contracts of partnership 
and of employment, and contracts of insurance.
401
 In such cases, the parties owe each other 
duties to consider each other’s interests, to act honestly, and to disclose material 
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information.
402
 In contrast, English law denies any general duty to disclose information on 
one party to a contract to the other.
403
   
Statutory intervention imposing good faith has been limited to unfair dismissal of employees 
and the law protecting residential and commercial tenants from forfeiture.
404
 English law has 
had to recognise the principle of good faith imposed by virtue of EU law, in particular in the 
field of consumer law regulating informational duties and unfair contract terms.
405
 However, a 
duty of good faith which is applicable only to certain contracts or by virtue of specific 
statutory provisions does not amount to a general recognition of the principle of good faith. 
Concerning good faith as a standard of behaviour in contract performance, the English law 
has become more willing to recognise express
406
 and implied terms of good faith or fairness 
in contracts.
407
 It was held in the recent English High Court case of Yam Seng PTE Ltd v 
International Trade Corp Ltd that a duty of good faith could be implied in fact into the 
contract in certain circumstances, in particular in longstanding relationships.
408
 Moreover, 
Leggatt J appeared on occasion to even extend the applicability of good faith to most, if not 
all commercial contracts, prohibiting, in addition to dishonesty, ‘improper’, ‘commercially 
unacceptable’, or ‘unconscionable’ conduct.409 Nevertheless, subsequent judicial comments 
have limited the implied duty of good faith to certain categories of contract dependant on the 
context and confirmed that there is no general doctrine of good faith in English contract 
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law.
410
 Therefore, an obligation of good faith contractual performance might be recognised by 
the courts only if expressly or implicitly agreed so by the parties but not by law.
411
 
As a result, English law has been even more reluctant to apply the principle of good faith to 
the pre-contractual stage.
412
 Agreements to agree have not been recognised as enforceable 
contracts.
413
 The longstanding position in English law on good faith negotiations in Walford v 
Miles, concerning an express agreement to negotiate, is that: 
[t]he concept of a duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is inherently repugnant to the adversarial 
position of the parties when involved in negotiations. Each party to the negotiations is entitled to pursue 
his (or her) own interest, so long as he avoids making misrepresentations. [---] A duty to negotiate in 
good faith is as unworkable in practice as it is inherently inconsistent with the position of a negotiating 
party.
414
 
Thus, in English law agreements to negotiate in good faith have been traditionally 
unenforceable due to lack of certainty.
415
 The parties are free to hold parallel negotiations and 
terminate negotiations at any time without incurring liability.
416
 However, this is without 
prejudice to prohibited types of behaviour such as misrepresentation, fraud, force and fear, or 
undue influence.
417
 For breach of confidence, there may be liability in tort.
418
 
Some recent cases have recognised the possible enforceability of express agreements to 
negotiate in circumstances where consideration is provided and the parameters, including a 
time limit and objectives of the negotiations, are clear.
419
 In Petromec Inc v Petroleo 
Brasileiro SA Petrobras (No.3) the Court of Appeal took a more liberal approach compared to 
Walford v Miles and rejected the unenforceability due to the uncertainty argument.
420
 
Nevertheless, Longmore LJ recognised the difficulty in establishing whether negotiations 
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have been broken off in bad faith and admitted that, in the absence of fraud, it would be 
unlikely that there would be a finding of bad faith.
421
  Thus, there is no radical departure from 
the settled case law emphasising that English law does not recognise a general duty to 
negotiate in good faith. 
H. Collins argues that the recent evolutions of English law, which have been in part already 
outlined above, amount to recognition of a ‘duty to negotiate with care’422 that in practice 
imposes upon the negotiating parties largely identical requirements as the culpa in 
contrahendo doctrine.
423
 The obligations include a) an obligation not to make any 
misrepresentation, b) obligation of information, c) obligation of good faith in uberrimae fidei 
contracts, and d) obligation of confidentiality. A breach of these obligations is sanctioned in 
accordance with the principles of misrepresentation, undue influence, collateral contracts, 
equitable estoppel, and implied contracts.
424
  
The author of the master thesis is of the opinion that the ‘duty to negotiate with care’ is 
narrower than an obligation to negotiate in good faith. Unless there is a power imbalance, e.g. 
in a consumer contract, prohibiting undue influence, the obligation of information is limited 
to the terms of the proposed transaction and does not include surrounding circumstances.
425
 
Thus, protection is generally afforded only against fraudulent non-disclosure. Similarly, the 
contracts of utmost good faith are limited to certain special relationships. The author has 
already argued above that these limitations preclude inferring a general obligation to negotiate 
in good faith.  
It is not precluded that the general standard of good faith in consumer law further influences 
the evolution of English private law towards a general principle of good faith governing all 
pre-contractual negotiations.
426
 M. Hesselink, however, states that English courts ‘do not have 
a tradition of regarding a specific statutory change as evidence of a broader underlying 
legislative intent to which they should give effect.’427  
In summary, English law recognises good faith contractual performance only to a limited 
extent. Lacking an express and clear undertaking to negotiate in good faith, English law does 
not recognise a general duty to negotiate in good faith but limits it to the prohibition of fraud, 
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force and fear, and the duty of confidentiality. Thus, compared to the civil law tradition, 
English common law imposes more lenient information obligations and does not sanction 
breaking off negotiations in bad faith.  
2.4.2 United States Law 
Recognition of good faith as a general principle of law in other common law jurisdictions is 
rather a recent, but significant, development.
428
 The recognition of good faith in contractual 
performance in the United States is inspired by German law.
429
 In contrast to English law, US 
courts have recognised a duty to perform contracts in good faith
430
 and this is reflected also in 
Section 1-304 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
431
 and Section 205 of the 1981 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
432
 Interestingly, American lawyers, perhaps due to being 
more familiar with the UCC, frequently take the advantage of Article 6 of the CISG to 
exclude it from international sales contract.
433
 
Article 1-201(20) of the UCC defines good faith as ‘honesty in fact and the observance of 
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing’ and is recognised by the majority of 
American jurisdictions.
434
 According to Article 1-302(b) the obligation of good faith may not 
be disclaimed by the parties by agreement but the parties may determine the standards of good 
faith performance.  
According to R. S. Summers, good faith is not limited to honesty
435
 and is best understood as 
an ‘excluder’ by ruling out different forms of bad faith.436 Section 205 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts is inspired by R. S. Summers’ theory437 and the comments provide a 
non-exhaustive list of types of bad faith – ‘evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack of 
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diligence and slacking off, willful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of a power to 
specify terms, and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party's 
performance.’438  
An alternative conceptualisation is provided by S. J. Burton, who argues that the duty to 
perform in good faith comes down to reasonable exercise of discretion, which is not the case 
where a party tries to recapture forgone opportunities.
439
 The latter approach is reflected, for 
example, in Nicholson v United Pacific Insurance Co, where it was held that ‘an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is measured in a particular contract by the justifiable 
expectations of the parties. Where one party acts arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably, 
that conduct exceeds the justifiable expectations of the second party.’440  
In practice, however, the theories are rather complementary than opposing.
441
 Nevertheless, P. 
MacMahon argues that good faith and fair dealing are underenforced in practice as a result of 
restrictive doctrinal tests and deferential standards of review.
442
 Despite the courts’ reluctance 
to award remedies for its violation, the norm of good faith and fair dealing binds the 
parties.
443
  
However, similarly to English law, in the US the idea of freedom of contract, revocability of 
offers,
444
 and the traditional aleatory view of negotiations leave the parties free to break off 
negotiations without risk of pre-contractual liability.
445
 Otherwise the parties might be 
discouraged from entering into negotiations.
446
 There has been reluctance even to enforce 
preliminary agreements to negotiate.
447
 While enforceability is supported by academics, case 
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law is divided regarding the enforceability of preliminary agreements, including agreements 
with open terms and agreements to negotiate.
448
 
Comment c to Section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that Section 
205, like Article 1-203 of the UCC, ‘does not deal with good faith in the formation of a 
contract.’ It further explains that  
[p]articular forms of bad faith in bargaining are the subjects of rules as to capacity to contract, mutual 
assent and consideration and of rules as to invalidating causes such as fraud and duress. See, for 
example, §§ 90 and 208. Moreover, remedies for bad faith in the absence of agreement are found in the 
law of torts or restitution. For examples of a statutory duty to bargain in good faith, see, e.g., National 
Labor Relations Act § 8(d) and the federal Truth in Lending Act. In cases of negotiation for 
modification of an existing contractual relationship, the rule stated in this Section may overlap with 
more specific rules requiring negotiation in good faith. See §§ 73, 89; Uniform Commercial Code § 2-
209 and Comment. 
As is common to most legal systems, US law prohibits fraudulent and coercive conduct 
during pre-contractual negotiations. In addition, Section 208 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts allows avoiding unconscionable contracts or contract terms, and Section 90 protects 
reasonable reliance on a promise. Thus, if agreement is reached, the contract can nevertheless 
be avoided on the grounds of misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, and 
unconsicionability but there is no recourse to damages.
449
 However, if the ‘preliminary 
negotiations’ fail, absent misrepresentation or deceit, the courts have traditionally been 
reluctant to impose pre-contractual liability.
450
  
E. A. Farnsworth argues that the established bases of liability, such as unjust enrichment, 
misrepresentation, and specific promise,
451
 if creatively used by litigants and liberally applied 
by courts, could afford the parties sufficient protection.
452
 While some scholars support a 
general obligation as a basis of liability, it is not supported by American courts.
453
 The author 
of the master thesis is of the opinion that the piecemeal solutions and, moreover, the 
commended liberal application of such rules, cannot amount to a general obligation. E. A. 
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Farnsworth opines that as long as the grounds are not often invoked and pushed to their limits 
there is little pressure for such general obligation.
454
 
As already argued above with regard to English law, the specific statutory duties to bargain in 
good faith also do not amount to a general recognition of an obligation to negotiate in good 
faith. Nevertheless, E. A. Farnsworth has used the statutory duty to bargain in good faith in 
the National Labor Relations Act
455
 by analogy to substantiate the duty of good faith in the 
context of preliminary agreements, which as he opines should be enforced under contract law 
and thus be subject to the duty of good faith.
456
  
E. A. Farnsworth distinguishes between preliminary agreements with open terms and 
preliminary agreements to negotiate,
457
 which both are subject to issues related to certainty 
and intent – two important contract formation requirements.458 With regard to preliminary 
agreements with open terms, he argues that the emerging legal rule imposes upon the parties a 
general implicit obligation of fair dealing in the negotiation of open terms, leaving the parties 
bound by the substantive terms previously agreed should the negotiations fail.
459
 In Teachers 
Insurance & Annuity Association of America v Tribune Co it was held that an obligation to 
negotiate bars ‘a party from renouncing the deal, abandoning the negotiations, or insisting on 
conditions that do not conform to the preliminary agreement.’460 
The breach of the duty to negotiate in good faith entitles the injured party to reliance damages 
and, in exceptional cases where such breach amounts to a serious breach, the injured party 
could withhold performance, and if the breach is uncured, terminate the contract and claim 
expectation damages and restitution.
461
 On the other hand, preliminary agreements to 
negotiate impose a duty to negotiate in good faith the failure of which leaves parties without 
any agreement.
462
 In this case, the injured party has no claim for expectation damages or 
specific performance but only under reliance or in some cases restitution.
463
 A. Schwartz and 
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R. E. Scott welcome the emerging rule with regard to reliance recovery, however, arguing 
from an economic perspective, they consider it unnecessary to require the parties to bargain in 
good faith.
464
  
US courts have been divided with regard to the enforceability of preliminary agreements to 
negotiate.
465
 Reasons for such reluctance include the indefiniteness of the preliminary 
agreements, difficulties determining the scope of the obligation of fair dealing (good faith), 
and uncertainty with regard to the appropriate remedy to be awarded.
466
 Many US states, e.g. 
Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Massachussets, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Tennessee, 
Texas, Utah, and Virginia, have refused to enforce agreements to negotiate at all.
467
 On the 
other hand, some states, e.g. California, Delaware, Illinois, New York, and Washington, have 
long enforced agreements to negotiate, limiting recovery to reliance
468
 damages.
469
  
The leading case of the latter approach is Itek Corp v Chicago Aerial Industries, where the 
parties were held to be under a duty to make ‘every reasonable effort’ to agree upon a formal 
contract.
470
 A recent example is the North Carolina Business Court decision in RREF BB 
Acquisitions LLC v MAS Properties.
471
 Nevertheless, as emphasised in Teachers Insurance & 
Annuity Association of America v Tribune Co, a clear expression of intent is required to 
overcome the strong presumption against enforcement.
472
 Lacking a clear expression of intent, 
the parties are merely in the preliminary negotiations phase to which no liability attaches.
473
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Only in some cases has a duty to negotiate in good faith been implied to the preliminary 
agreement.
474
 
E. A. Farnsworth has substantiated the duty to negotiate in good faith by outlining, partly by 
analogy with the obligation to bargain in good faith in National Labor Relations Act,
475
 seven 
types of bad faith conduct during contract negotiations:  
1) refusal to negotiate, including dilatory tactics and making bargaining conditional upon 
unreasonable terms;  
2) improper tactics amounting to fraud, duress, or lack of any kind of willingness to 
compromise;  
3) unreasonable proposals;  
4) non-disclosure about parallel negotiations or if disclosure is required to correct a 
previous statement, including notifying the other party of a change of mind regarding 
the intent to conclude an agreement. Absent a fiduciary duty,
476
 a negotiating party 
does not have to disclose information relevant to its bargaining position; 
5) if a definite undertaking that negotiations will be exclusive exists, holding parallel 
negotiations; 
6) reneging contract terms already agreed to unless appropriate concessions are made; 
7) breaking off negotiations before reaching an impasse or without other justified ground 
such as unfair dealing by the other negotiating party, mistake, impracticability, or 
changed circumstances, including an opportunity to conclude the deal with a third 
party.
477
 
Similarly, R. S. Summers has argued that, substantively, good faith could be invoked to rule 
out various forms of bad faith at the negotiation and contract formation stage, including  
negotiating without serious intent to contract, abusing the privilege to break off negotiations, entering 
into a contract without having the intent to perform, entering a deal recklessly disregarding prospective 
inability to perform, failing to disclose known defects in goods being sold, and taking undue advantage 
of superior bargaining power to strike an unconscionable bargain.
478
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To sum up, the obligation to negotiate in good faith arises only if expressly taken on by 
contract.
479
 In any event, the expectations of the parties must be considered taking into 
account the language of the agreement and the surrounding circumstances.
480
 It is useful to 
regulate in the agreement to negotiate the exclusivity of the negotiations, the duration of the 
negotiations, and duties of disclosure and confidentiality.
481
 With the exception of the state of 
Louisiana and the territory of Puerto Rico,
482
 there is no general obligation to negotiate in 
good faith in US contract law.
483
 Nevertheless, US contract law recognises a duty to perform 
contracts in good faith. 
2.4.3 Australian Law 
In Australia, writers and courts below the level of the High Court of Australia (HCA) are 
generally quite open to the use of good faith,
484
 but a clear position of the HCA on the issue is 
lacking.
485
 Sir A. F. Mason has argued that the concept of good faith is part of Australian 
law.
486
 J. W. Carter and E. Peden are of the opinion that good faith is inherent in contract law 
and that the proper basis of good faith is contract construction.
487
  Thus, good faith does not 
need to be separately articulated either by implication of terms or through codification. 
Nevertheless, T. Wilson argues that ‘[i]n any codification or restatement of Australian 
contract law there should be some focus on “internationalisation” of contract law, including 
the incorporation of a good faith obligation’, which is important in the context of increased 
international trade, Australian law firms merging with international firms, and a desire to 
attract international litigation and arbitration to Australia.
488
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In commercial contractual performance and enforcement Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd 
v Minister for Public Works,
489
 where reasonableness in performance was implied as a 
contract term, provides the basis for the emergence of a line of authority creating a common 
law obligation of good faith.
490
 Further cases have substantiated good faith as: 
(a) not bad faith such as parties not acting opportunistically or using contract terms for purposes antithetical 
to the contract that are calculated to extract value from the other contracting party; 
(b) requiring parties to act honestly; 
(c) not acting arbitrarily, capriciously, unreasonably or recklessly; 
(d) not requiring a party to act in the interests of the other party to the contract; 
(e) not imposing obligations on the parties that, in effect, inconsistent with the terms of the contract; 
(f) incorporating reasonableness; and 
(g) being equated with fair dealing.491 
According to Sir A. F. Mason, the concept is to embrace ‘no less than three related notions: 
(1) an obligation on the parties to co-operate in achieving the contractual objects (loyalty to 
the promise itself); (2) compliance with honest standards of conduct; and (3) compliance with 
standards of conduct which are reasonable having regard to the interests of the parties.’492 
These expressions of good faith are similar to those recognised by Legatt J in Yam Seng.
493
 
The HCA in Royal Botanic Gardens and Domain Trust v South Sydney City Council
494
 and 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker
495
 refused to decide the issue of good faith as 
unnecessary at that point. However, Kirby J in his dissent in Royal Botanic Gardens 
highlighted that an implied term in a commercial contract ‘appears to be inconsistent with the 
law as it has developed in Australia in respect of the introduction of implied terms into written 
contracts which the parties have omitted to include.’496 
A decision of the HCA, i.e. the only court with the power to make new law, would be 
desirable as currently there are diverging views and approaches as to good faith’s mode of 
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application and precise meaning among academics
497
 and within Australian courts.
498
 On the 
one hand, the courts of New South Wales
499
 and along their lines the courts of South 
Australia, Western Australia and Queensland
500
 have more or less recognised both express 
terms of good faith
501
 and terms of good faith implied by law
502
 in all commercial contracts as 
long as they do not conflict with express terms of the contract. On the other hand, the courts 
of Victoria and Tasmania have recognised express obligations of good faith
503
 but have been 
more reluctant to imply good faith terms by law,
504
 limiting such instances to certain contracts 
of imbalance of power
505
 or implying good faith only as a matter of fact.
506
 Thus, the duty of 
good faith, unless expressly and clearly agreed to by the parties themselves, is not universally 
recognised by Australian courts yet.
507
  
Furthermore, J. W. Carter et al. argue that since intermediate appellate courts have only a 
limited ability to make new law, i.e. to decide upon a lack of implied good faith, the issue is 
resolved.
508
 In CGU Workers Compensation (NSW) Ltd v Garcia and similarly in Esso 
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Australia Resources Pty Ltd v Southern Pacific Petroleum NL,
509
 it has been held that ‘good 
faith’ is not a term ‘to be inserted into every contract or even into every aspect of a particular 
contract’. 510 Intermediate appellate courts and trial judges in Australia should not depart from 
the decisions in intermediate appellate courts in another jurisdiction unless they are convinced 
that the interpretation is plainly wrong.
511
 Thus, the state of law in Australia is that no term of 
good faith can be implied by law in all commercial contracts.
512
 A. Gray hopes that in the 
light of recent English and Canadian Supreme Court judgments the HCA would in an 
appropriate case be more willing to recognise a good faith obligation.
513
 
Sir A. F. Mason has suggested that Australian law incorporates some aspects of the good faith 
doctrine through the traditional equitable notions of equity, good conscience,
514
 and bona 
fides and has shifted towards emphasising the need to take into account the other party’s 
reasonable expectations.
515
 Similarly to English and US law, the Australian law prohibits 
misrepresentations, undue influence, and unconscionable conduct, and also provides for the 
doctrine of estoppel, including promissory estoppel.
516
 T. Wilson argues that the doctrine of 
unconscionability resembles the principle of good faith by preferring substance over form and 
prohibiting unconscionable adherence to strict legal rights, i.e. abuse of rights.
517
 However, 
the HCA has taken a narrow view of unconscionability allowing judicial interventional only 
in cases of substantial disadvantage
518
 and not mere inequality of bargaining power.
519
 Thus, 
the doctrine of unconscionability is narrower than the principle of good faith.
520
 
Duties to take into account the expectations of the other party arise, e.g. in fiduciary 
relationships and by law in insurance contracts.
521
 Statutory intervention has also been 
concerned with employment contracts and franchise agreements,
522
 where the duty of good 
faith is required due to power imbalances. Australian expansive consumer protection 
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legislation includes general prohibitions on misleading or deceptive conduct and on 
unconscionable conduct occurring in ‘trade or commerce’.523  As of 12 November 2016, 
unfair contract term protections will also cover small business contracts and, thus, by the end 
of 2016, three-quarters of the final spending in Australia’s economy will be expressly covered 
by a statutory obligation of good faith.
524
 While there is no general statutory obligation of 
good faith yet, it is suggested that the time might be ripe for it.
525
 
Good faith in Australia is mainly discussed in the context of contractual performance rather 
than pre-contractual negotiations as a result of the emphasis on freedom of contract.
526
 In 
Sabemo Pty Ltd v North Sydney Municipal Council it was stated that: 
It has long been the law that parties are free to negotiate such contract as they may choose to enter into. 
Until such contract comes about, they are negotiations only. Each is at liberty, no matter how capricious 
his reason, to break off negotiations at any time. If that occurs then it is the end of the matter and, 
generally speaking, neither party will be under any liability to the other.
527
 
Sir A. F. Mason was cautious not to extend the duty of good faith to negotiations, unless there 
is an express and sufficiently certain agreement to negotiate in good faith.
528
 For example, in 
United Group Rail Services v Rail Corporation of New South Wales,
529
 the NSW Court of 
Appeal held that, while an agreement to agree that lacks essential terms was clearly 
unenforceable,
530
 it did not follow that an agreement to negotiate in good faith to settle a 
dispute arising under a contract was unenforceable.
531
  
In Macquarie International Health Clinic Pty Ltd v Sydney South West Area Health Service
532
 
a preliminary agreement was enforced and a contractual obligation to disclose important 
information imposed. In addition to repeating the definition of good faith of Sir A. F. 
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Mason,
533
 the court emphasised that when negotiating in good faith, an ‘objective element of 
reasonableness in fair dealing is appropriate, taking its place with honesty and fidelity to the 
bargain in the furtherance of the contractual objects and purposes of the parties, objectively 
ascertained.’534 Nevertheless, the promise of good faith must be construed ‘having regard to 
the terms of the contract and the circumstances known to the parties in which it was entered 
into.’535 More recently the Supreme Court of Victoria in North East Solutions Pty Ltd v 
Masters Home Improvement Australia Pty Ltd confirmed the enforceability of an express 
agreement to negotiate in good faith.
536
 
To sum up, the duty of good faith in contractual performance has not been recognised in 
Australia at the level of the HCA and is extended to contract negotiations only where an 
express and clear agreement to that regard exists. 
2.4.4 Canadian Law 
In Canada, the principle of good faith in the performance of contracts is now recognised both 
in its civil law province Quebec
537
 and the common law provinces and territories. Aiming to 
resolve uncertainties arising from case law, the British Columbia Law Institute (BCLI) in 
2011 published a report recommending the inclusion of the obligation of good faith 
contractual performance in a draft Contract Fairness Act. It defines good faith as:  
(a) exercise discretionary powers conferred by a contract reasonable and for their intended purpose, 
(b) cooperate in securing performance of the main objects of the contract, and 
(c) refrain from strategic behaviour designed to evade contractual obligations.
538
 
The BCLI also considered that the time is not ripe to extend the duty to pre-contractual 
negotiations.
539
 However, the Contract Fairness Act has not been adopted by the British 
Columbia Legislative Assembly. 
The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has forestalled the HCA and brought some clarity to 
common law Canada.
540
 In November 2014 in Bhasin v Hrynew, it clearly recognised that 
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good faith contractual performance is a general ‘organizing principle’ of Canadian common 
law, operating irrespective of the intentions of the parties, imposing upon the parties to a 
contract a duty to act honestly in the performance of their contractual obligations.
541
 It 
manifests itself through existing doctrines such as unconscionability, implied terms and 
principles of interpretation, duties of honesty and reasonableness, and prohibition to act 
capriciously or arbitrarily in contractual performance.
542
 It requires the party performing the 
contract to consider, but not necessarily serve, the legitimate contractual interests of the 
contracting partner.
543
  
The new general duty of honesty is limited to a duty ‘not to lie or mislead the other party 
about one’s contractual performance’ and does not require loyalty, disclosure, or foregoing 
advantages flowing from the contract.
544
 The duties are similar to the duties of implied good 
faith in England and Australia.
545
  Nevertheless, the effect of Bhasin v Hrynew for all cases is 
limited to the minimum requirement of honesty, which the parties may not exclude, and the 
further scope of the duties of good faith depends on the relationship.
546
 Thus, G. R. Hall 
argues that Bhasin v Hrynew is ‘only a step towards an organising principle of good faith in 
contract law’.547 
With the exception of Quebec,
548
 Canadian courts have not accepted that there is an obligation 
to conduct negotiations in good faith extending beyond the requirement of honesty absent a 
special relationship such as in the context of commercial tendering or insurance.
549
 As 
opposed to the English courts, the SCC has explicitly rejected imposing duties of disclosure 
between the negotiating parties through the tort of negligence as undermining the proper risk 
allocation during the negotiations and conflicting with the idea of adversarial negotiations and 
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parties’ freedom to withdraw from negotiations.550 It has referred to other causes of action, 
such as undue influence, economic duress, unconscionability, negligent misrepresentation, 
fraud, and the tort of deceit as covering much of the wrongful conduct committed during 
negotiations and providing appropriate remedies.
551
 
On the influence of English case law, courts in common law Canada have generally also 
refused to enforce any agreements to negotiate in good faith due to uncertainty.
552
 However, 
in Empress Towers Ltd v Bank of Nova Scotia a principle was advanced that an agreement to 
negotiate in good faith is enforceable if it refers to an objective standard guiding the conduct 
of negotiations.
553
 In Molson Canada 2005 v Miller Brewing Co it was held that such 
agreements need to be interpreted in their context in accordance with the parties’ intentions 
and may be sufficiently certain to be enforceable.
554
 
It might be that after the SCC’s decision in Bhasin v Hrynew the courts are more willing to 
enforce agreements to negotiate even without an articulated objective standard.
555
 The duty of 
good faith in negotiations is still limited to honesty and having appropriate regard for the 
legitimate contractual interests of the contracting partner, including not eviscerating the very 
purpose of the agreement. The latter duty entails an obligation to make genuine efforts to 
reach an agreement and may be breached in cases of refusing to negotiate, taking unflinching 
positions, and bargaining with no intention to reach an agreement.
 556
 
In conclusion, while the duty of good faith in contractual performance is recognised in 
Canada, it is not extended to contract negotiations absent an express and clear agreement to 
that regard. 
2.4.5 Alternative Approaches to Protecting Pre-contractual Reliance 
Alternative routes are pursued in common law jurisdictions in order to reach just results for 
the negotiating parties in cases of possible bad faith conduct during contract negotiations.
557
 It 
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has been stated that in English law problems of unfairness are dealt with by piecemeal 
solutions.
558
 In Yam Seng v ITC, Leggatt J, having studied English case law, determined that 
different doctrines, such as implied contract, claims of restitution, misrepresentation, 
equitable estoppel, or unjust enrichment, are applied to protect from breaches of good faith in 
pre-contractual negotiations.
559
 Similar solutions exist in other common law jurisdictions, e.g. 
Australia and Canada. It has been suggested that in the US the doctrinal functions of culpa in 
contrahendo have been served, among others, by relaxing some of the contract formation 
elements and by the doctrines of implied contract, unjust enrichment, estoppel, fraud, 
misrepresentation, and negligence in order to protect reasonable reliance on a promise.
560
  
In the following, the doctrines of restitution, promissory estoppel, misrepresentation, and the 
tort of deceit in the common law are discussed and compared with the doctrine of culpa in 
contrahendo in the civil law.
561
 It has been argued that these doctrines do not adequately deal 
with pre-contractual liability compared to culpa in contrahendo.
562
 The author of the master 
thesis is of the opinion that while some aspects of the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo are 
covered by these piecemeal solutions, the differences in their recognition and application do 
not allow to infer a general duty to negotiate in good faith in the common law. 
Unjust Enrichment 
Under the doctrine of unjust enrichment, there is a duty to make restitution of unjust gains 
received during negotiations.
563
 The principle of unjust enrichment requires: ‘first, that the 
defendant has been enriched by the receipt of a benefit [or has made a request]; secondly, that 
this enrichment is at the expense of the claimant; thirdly that the retention of the enrichment 
be unjust and finally that there is no defence or bar to the claim.’564 The benefit might result 
from money mistakenly paid to another party, a misappropriation of ideas which among 
others could amount to a breach of confidential relation, if such relation is pre-existing, or 
                                                 
558
 Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd, p 439. 
559
 Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corp Ltd, paras 135-141, 145. See also Fonseca, p 13. 
560
 Kessler and Fine, pp 401, 408; Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 205, comment c. See also 
Summers 1968, pp 198, 217; Farnsworth 1987, pp 229-238; Nedzel, pp 98, 102, 119, 127-128. 
561
 The doctrine of implied contract is concerned with contract interpretation and has been already discussed in 
the previous sections.  
562
 Mirmina, p 78. 
563
 Farnsworth 1987, pp 229-233; Chitty on Contracts 2015, para 29-017; Banakas, p 4. 
564
 British Steel Corp v Cleveland Bridge & Engineering Co Ltd. Queen's Bench Division, [1981] 1 All ER 504 
(QB), 21 December 1981; Pettkus v Becker. Supreme Court of Canada, (1980) 2 SCR 834, p 848. See also 
Chitty on Contracts 2015, para 29-017; Halsbury’s Laws of Canada – Contracts, HCO-38. The test is not 
endorsed by the HCA. Australian courts have developed specific requirements for different types of claims in 
restitution claims. However, for the purposes of the master thesis, it is not necessary to undertake an in depth 
analysis of the doctrine of unjust enrichment. 
76 
 
from services rendered during unsuccessful negotiations upon the request of the other 
negotiating party.
565
  
The requirements of benefit and/or request impose upon the injured party a heavy burden of 
proof. Moreover, a claim for unjust enrichment is not a claim for damages but a claim in 
debt.
566
 Therefore, the doctrine of unjust enrichment does not provide recovery for out-of-
pocket expenses related to negotiations – a risk taken by the negotiating party. Restitution 
based on unjust enrichment is also provided for in the civil law legal systems. Thus, the 
common law unjust enrichment doctrine does not improve the situation of the aggrieved 
negotiating party. 
Misrepresentation and Tort of Deceit 
To an extent, common law protects a negotiating party from the other party’s fraudulent, 
negligent, and innocent misrepresentations.
567
 In all common law jurisdictions, fraudulent 
misrepresentation provides a ground for rescinding the contract and a claim for damages in 
tort of deceit.
568
 Even negligent and innocent material misrepresentations provide a ground for 
rescinding the contract.
569
 However, innocent misrepresentation does not provide a cause of 
action for damages. Traditionally, negligent misrepresentation did not provide a cause of 
action for damages in tort as well.  
Negligent misrepresentation as a cause of action for damages became recognised in English 
law after Hedley Byrne
570
 and on its influence also in the common law of the US, Australia, 
and Canada.
571
 In English law, since the coming into force of the Misrepresentation Act 1967, 
the representee who entered a contract as the result of a misrepresentation is able to claim 
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damages both for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation. In the latter case the representee 
might be prevented from rescinding the contract and may be awarded damages in lieu of 
rescission.
572
 Liability in damages for negligent misrepresentation can arise only where a 
party owed the other party a duty of care.
573
  While some differences between the common 
law legal systems exist as to when such a duty arises, there is a reluctance to recognise it as 
arising between all negotiating parties and also in instances where the damage is pure 
economic loss.
574
 
In case the negotiations have failed there is no contract to rescind. Since negligent 
misrepresentation as a cause of action for damages is only available where a duty of care 
exists, the representor will usually have to bring a claim in fraud, which is not easy to 
prove.
575
 In order to establish a cause of action in the tort of deceit, there must be a false 
representation made knowingly, without belief in its truth, or recklessly, with the intention of 
inducing the other party’s reliance, and on which the other party has detrimentally relied 
on.
576
 In addition, the test for pure economic loss is subject to narrow constraints as there is 
no general duty of care to protect the economic interests of another person.
577
 
As a rule, the misrepresentation must be a false statement of fact as opposed to a statement of 
opinion, a statement of intention, or a mere commendatory statement.
578
 However, a 
representation as to future intention might amount to a fraudulent misrepresentation of fact, if 
the representor did not intend on fulfilling it at the time of making the representation.
579
 This 
is similar to the obligation not to engage in or continue negotiations without intention to reach 
agreement under the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo.
580
 However, while fraud prohibits the 
provision of inaccurate information, it does not impose upon the parties a duty of information. 
Absent a contract uberrimae fidei, fiduciary duty, or statutory duty to disclose; mere non-
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disclosure does not constitute misrepresentation but a failure to correct a prior representation 
might.
581
 Thus, the law of tort lacks the efficiency of culpa in contrahendo. 
Promissory Estoppel 
Of particular interest for the purposes of the master thesis and also a subject of some 
controversy is the doctrine of promissory estoppel, i.e. specific promise, falling short of being 
an offer and usually unenforceable for want of consideration, as a basis for liability. 
According to N. E. Nedzel, promissory estoppel in Section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts is one of the main theories relied upon in pre-contractual situations by American 
common law.
582
 Section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states: 
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite 
and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance 
is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. 
Thus, a negotiating party may not break a promise made during negotiations if the other party 
has reasonably relied on it.
583
 The often cited case for promissory estoppel in the US is 
Hoffman v Red Owl Stores.
584
 The doctrine has also been recognised in Australia in Waltons 
Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher.
585
 However, apart from recognising proprietary estoppel 
concerning contracts for the sale of land,
586
 English and Canadian law do not recognise 
promissory estoppel as a sword, i.e. as a cause of action, but only as a shield, i.e. a defence.587 
Promissory estoppel might protect a negotiating party from the other party engaging in 
negotiations without a real intention to reach an agreement or from unjustified breaking off of 
negotiations.
588
 The doctrine may also help to bypass formalities, such as the requirement that 
an agreement be reduced to writing, by allowing enforcement of oral promises in certain 
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circumstances, e.g. where an inequitable advantage has been taken from the promisee, 
‘resulting in unjust enrichment or ‘unconscionable injury’.589  
However, Hoffman v Red Owl Stores has received scant support in the US – its influence has 
been more marked in the law review than in the law reports
590
 and is rarely a successful cause 
of action.
591
 Promissory estoppel is criticised as imprecise and conclusional.
592
 It imposes a 
heavy burden of proof on the promisee that a specific enough promise was made and that it 
was reasonable to rely on it in the context of the negotiations.
593
 Moreover, it is concerned 
with promises rather than statements exchanged during pre-contractual negotiations.
594
 The 
amount of damages to be awarded is left to the discretion of courts. While expectation 
damages are not excluded, promissory estoppel compensates reliance damages ‘only to the 
extent necessary to avoid injustice’.595 Thus, compensation for out-of-pocket costs arising 
from the failed negotiations might not compensable. Inconsistent application of the doctrine 
might add to the reluctance of courts to grant relief under promissory estoppel.
596
 Thus, due to 
its deficiencies and a lack of universal recognition and application in common law legal 
systems, the doctrine of promissory estoppel does not provide a generally recognised duty to 
negotiate in good faith. 
2.5 Concluding Remarks: Nothing New Under the Sun of International Law 
In previous sections the author has undertaken a comparative study of national legal systems 
necessary in search for a general principle of law recognised by civilised nations.  The author 
finds that, on the one hand, the duties of good faith contractual performance and of good faith 
pre-contractual negotiations are generally recognised in the civil law legal tradition, including 
Germany, France, the Netherlands and other civil law legal systems. On the other hand, the 
duty of good faith is not universally recognised in the common law legal systems where the 
freedom of contract strongly prevails. In the US and Canada the duty of good faith contractual 
performance is implied by law and cannot be excluded but the parties can determine the good 
faith standards. In English and Australian law the duty can usually only be implied in fact and 
can, thus, be excluded by express agreement. In all analysed common law legal systems the 
implied duty of good faith cannot override the parties’ express agreement. Furthermore, 
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common law does not recognise a general duty to negotiate in good faith, i.e. absent an 
express and clear agreement to that regard. 
Acceptance of the principle of good faith in common law in certain contracts uberrimae fidei 
or by limited statutory intervention does not amount to a general recognition of the principle 
of good faith. Such contracts often reflect the inequality of the negotiating parties. However, 
in international law, States pursue their own interests and despite the inevitable imbalance of 
power between States, the sovereign equality of States is recognised. H. Thirlway has urged 
the need to ‘respect the pattern of relationships’ when transferring rules or principles from 
domestic law to the international level.
597
 Thus, an analogy would not be appropriate here. 
Furthermore, while aiming for justice, the piecemeal solutions, such as unjust enrichment, 
misrepresentation, and promissory estoppel established in common law jurisdictions, are less 
effective compared to the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo. In particular, the informational 
obligations in common law are much more lenient than in the civil law legal tradition and 
there is little or no protection against breaking off negotiations. 
Therefore, the author of the master thesis is of the opinion that at the moment it is not possible 
to convincingly deduce a general principle of law as recognised by civilised nations that 
would provide for a general duty to negotiate in good faith. The clearest common thread 
between common law and civil law pre-contractual duties is the duty to refrain from 
fraudulent misrepresentations. However, it usually only provides a remedy in case the 
negotiations resulted in a contract. Prohibition of fraud is already recognised in international 
law in Article 49 of the VCLT and as a general principle of law. In contrast to common law, 
the enforceability of express and clear agreements to negotiate in good faith in international 
law does not require the existence of consideration
598
 and the obligation to perform them in 
good faith derives from the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Therefore, it can be said that 
there is nothing new under the sun of international law by virtue of Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ 
Statute in the context of pre-contractual duties to negotiate in good faith. Hence, the analysis 
in this chapter confirms the sub-hypothesis that the obligation to negotiate in good faith is not 
a general principle of law common to domestic legal systems.  
It is not necessary and possible to demonstrate transposability to the international level 
although it has been argued above in section 2.1 that the analogy would be in principle 
possible and appropriate. Nevertheless, despite a lack of recognition in the common law legal 
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tradition, the strong recognition of the duty to negotiate in good faith in the civil law legal 
tradition supports the author’s conclusion in subsection 1.2.3 that a general obligation to 
negotiate in good faith exists in customary international law. 
82 
 
3 CONSEQUENCES OF A BREACH OF THE OBLIGATION TO 
NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH 
This chapter aims to establish whether and what kind of consequences, in particular, legal 
consequences, follow a breach of the obligation to negotiate in good faith. The following 
subsections give an overview of the consequences under the VCLT and the law of State 
responsibility. Procedural consequences stemming from a breach of the obligation to 
negotiate disputes as a prerequisite for recourse to judicial settlement are not within the scope 
of the master thesis.
599
 
It has been argued, e.g. by the authors of the Harvard Draft Convention and H. Kelsen, that 
the principle of good faith is merely a moral principle and, thus, no sanctions, such as duty to 
make reparation for any losses or damages sustained by the other party, result from the failure 
to act in accordance with it.
600
 Clearly, bad faith conduct during international negotiations has 
political implications – it might result in a loss of credibility that consequently may lessen the 
effectiveness of that nation’s foreign policies.601 However, the author of the master thesis has 
argued that a duty to negotiate in good faith is a legal obligation and its breach results in legal 
consequences. This is so where the parties are under a conventional or general international 
law obligation to negotiate or where an agreement to negotiate between the parties is implicit. 
The legal nature of the duty to negotiate in good faith (VCLT Draft Article 15(a)) was also 
noted by SR Fitzmaurice and SR Waldock when drafting the VCLT.
602
 Thus, the master 
thesis focuses on legal consequences rather than political. 
Judge Lauterpacht has noted that the principle of good faith ‘has a very limited practical 
sphere of operation unless a court is in a position to examine and assess the conduct of the 
State concerned.’ The scope of application is further constricted by evidentiary difficulties 
and the well-established principle that bad faith is not to be presumed.
603
 Nevertheless, action 
not in good faith is a breach of a general international law obligation, even if it is a breach 
which is hard to establish and whose consequences may be uncertain.
 604
 Moreover, ‘if a rule 
is clearly stated [---] conceptually consistent with other generally accepted norms, and applied 
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consistently (or, at the very least, demands for compliance are consistently made), then the 
rule will exert a pull toward compliance.’605 
3.1 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
A breach of duty to negotiate in good faith might in certain circumstances provide a basis for 
the termination or suspension of a treaty. Article 60 of the VCLT provides for the termination 
or suspension of a treaty in case of a material breach by one of the parties.
606
 A material 
breach could be established for example in the case of a failure to enter into negotiations if: 
‘(1) the treaty contained an express provision requiring negotiation under certain 
circumstances; or (2) the treaty created overlapping rights which could only be defined for 
one party in relation to the rights of the other party or parties even without an express 
requirement to negotiate.’607 
Absent a conventional or general international law based obligation to negotiate, which must 
be performed in good faith according to the principle of pacta sunt servanda, VCLT regulates 
States’ conduct during pre-contractual negotiations only to a limited extent. Clearest 
manifestations of bad faith conduct prohibited by the VCLT during treaty negotiations are 
fraud, corruption, and coercion (Articles 49-52 of the VCLT) as grounds for invalidating a 
treaty or the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty. 
A defrauded State may invoke fraud in Article 49 and a State whose representative has been 
corrupted may invoke corruption in Article 50 as invalidating its consent to be bound by a 
treaty. Thus, the consent is not ipso facto void but only voidable. In contrast, an expression of 
a State’s consent to be bound procured by coercion of its representative is according to Article 
51 without any legal effect, i.e. it is ipso facto and absolutely void. The defrauded or 
corrupted State may choose whether to invoke fraud or corruption with respect to a separable 
clause affected or the entire treaty. In cases of coercion of a State representative, the invalidity 
of consent may only be invoked with regard to the whole treaty.  
According to Article 52 a treaty the conclusion of which has been procured by the illegal 
threat or use of force is entirely void, i.e. it has no legal force by virtue of law from the outset. 
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Thus, the principle of pacta sunt servanda is not applicable. However, the treaty is presumed 
valid until its voidness is established.
608
  
In all cases, the invalidity must be invoked or established in accordance with the procedure set 
forth in Article 65-68 of the VCLT. In cases of fraud and corruption, the invalidity may only 
be invoked by the directly affected State, in cases of coercion of a State representative any 
party to the treaty except for the coercing State may invoke the invalidity of the consent.  The 
invoking State must notify the other State parties of its claim in writing indicating a measure 
to be taken with respect to the treaty and the reasons thereof (ARSIWA Articles 65(1) and 
67(1). If no party objects, the invoking State may declare the treaty invalid through an 
instrument communicated to the other parties (ARSIWA Articles 65(2) and 67(2)).  
If objection has been raised by any other party, the parties must resort to peaceful means of 
dispute settlement as indicated in Article 33 of the UN Charter (ARSIWA Article 65(3)). If 
the parties are nevertheless unable to find a solution, Article 66 will apply. The burden of 
proof is with the State claiming voidness.
609
 Thus, under the VCLT, the aggrieved State 
cannot release itself from its treaty obligations unilaterally.
610
 According to Article 45 of the 
VCLT the State loses the right to invoke fraud and corruption as the grounds for invalidating 
a treaty if it has expressly agreed to the treaty’s validity or must by reason of its conduct be 
considered as having acquiesced in its validity. 
Article 69 sets out the consequences of the invalidity of a treaty. If the invalidity is 
successfully established the State’s consent is void from the outset. In cases of fraud, 
corruption, coercion, and illegal use of force each party, except for the ‘infringing’ party may 
require any other party to restore as far as possible the status quo ante. Nevertheless, acts 
performed in good faith before the invalidity was invoked are not rendered unlawful by 
reason of the invalidity of the treaty. 
According to Article 42(1) the list of grounds in Articles 46-53 for invalidating State’s 
consent to be bound by a treaty is exhaustive.
611
 However, based on Article 31(3)(c) Klabbers 
argues that additional grounds of invalidity cannot be ruled out.
612
 An example of such 
additional grounds could be economic and political duress, which does not amount to use of 
force. However, a discussion of the feasibility of additional grounds of invalidity is out of the 
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scope of the master thesis. Other cases of bad faith conduct during contract negotiations rather 
obstruct reaching an agreement. 
In conclusion, the VCLT allows terminating or suspending a treaty in case a breach of the 
obligation to negotiate amounts to a material breach. In cases of fraud, corruption, coercion, 
and illegal use of force a treaty may be rendered invalid. Nevertheless, according to Article 73 
of the VCLT its provisions are without prejudice to any questions that may arise in regard to a 
treaty from the international responsibility of a State. The rules of State responsibility are 
complementary to the VCLT.
613
 Thus, the instances of bad faith discussed in this subsection 
may also be remedied under the law of State responsibility. Moreover, in most cases bad faith 
conduct during contract negotiations obstructs the conclusion of a treaty, and there is no treaty 
breached or to invalidate. According to the preamble of the VCLT, the rules of customary 
international law will continue to govern questions not regulated by the provisions of the 
VCLT. Thus, in such cases, the injured State can have recourse to remedies under the law of 
state responsibility. 
3.2 Law of State Responsibility 
The rules on State responsibility, which are part of the customary international law,
614
 
regulate the conditions and consequences for holding a State responsible for attributable 
violations of their international legal obligations. According to Article 1 of the ARSIWA 
‘[e]very internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that 
State.’ Article 2 prescribes the elements of an internationally wrongful act or omission: 1) 
attributability to the State under international law; and 2) breach of an international obligation 
of the State. 
There is little doubt that conduct during international negotiations between States is 
attributable to a State. States have the capacity to conclude treaties and are represented during 
the negotiations by Heads of State, Heads of Government, Ministers for Foreign Affairs, 
heads of diplomatic missions, representatives accredited to an international conference, or 
persons reproducing full powers. Thus, the conduct of State representatives during 
negotiations is in attributable to the State under Articles 4 or 5 of the ARSIWA. 
According to Article 12 of the ARSIWA ‘[t]here is a breach of an international obligation by 
a State when an act of that State is not in conformity with what is required of it by that 
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obligations, regardless of its origin or character.’ International law does not distinguish 
between contractual and tortious liability.
615
 Substantive obligations and procedural 
obligations, such as the obligation to negotiate in good faith, are treated in the same manner 
for the purposes of establishing responsibility.
616
 Responsibility is not predicated on the 
subjective fault of the State, unless the primary obligation requires fault or intent,
617
 which is 
the case for establishing some instances of bad faith conduct, in particular, fraud; but not 
necessarily an abuse of right.
618
 
Fraud, corruption, coercion, and use of force as grounds of invalidity in the VCLT and also 
being either general principles of law or rules of customary international law constitute 
internationally wrongful acts.
619
 The obligation to negotiate in good faith is an international 
legal obligation having either an express conventional or general international law basis or 
resulting from an implicit agreement to negotiate between States. Moreover, an obligation to 
negotiate in good faith is a rule of customary international law. Thus, breaching the obligation 
to negotiate in good faith is a breach of an international obligation, unless the wrongfulness is 
precluded by the circumstances precluding wrongfulness, such as consent, self-defence, 
countermeasures, force majeure, distress, or necessity (ARSIWA Articles 20-25). 
The responsibility of a State can be invoked by the State to whom the obligation breached was 
individually owed to or also by other specifically affected States if the obligation breached 
was of an erga omnes partes or erga omnes character (the ‘injured State’) (ARSIWA Article 
42). The invoking State must give notice of its claim to the responsible State and may specify 
in particular the conduct that the responsible State should take in order to cease the wrongful 
act if it is continuing, and what form should reparation take (ARSIWA Article 43). The 
admissibility of claims might be restricted by the rules relating to the nationality of claims and 
exhaustion of legal remedies (ARSIWA Article 44). The right to invoke responsibility is lost 
if the injured State has validly waived the claim or is to be considered validly acquiesced in 
the lapse of the claim (ARSIWA Article 45). 
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If a State violates a treaty, e.g. an express agreement to negotiate in good faith or an 
obligation to negotiate inherent in the treaty regime, the injured State may, on the one hand, 
rely on the remedies under the VCLT and, on the other hand, as is also the case for breach of 
other international legal obligations, avail itself of the remedies under the law of State 
responsibility. The latter include the continued duty of performance, cessation of the wrongful 
act, assurances and guarantees of non-repetition as well as reparation (ARSIWA Articles 29-
31). If the obligation is of an erga omnes partes or erga omnes character, other than injured 
States are entitled to invoke responsibility in the interest of the international community 
where collective goods or the common welfare is concerned
620
 but their claims are limited to 
cessation, assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, and performance of the obligation of 
reparation (ARSIWA Article 48). 
If a State has breached the obligation to negotiate in good faith, the continued duty of 
performance under the law of state responsibility requires the State to undertake and/or 
continue negotiations in good faith, the content of which is described in section 1 of the 
master thesis. An obligation to cease the act, if it is continuing, and offer appropriate 
assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so require, depends on the 
circumstances of the case and the exact conduct of the ‘infringing’ State. For example, the 
‘infringing’ State might be required to cease acts frustrating the purposes of the negotiations 
and abusing its rights, e.g. by interrupting communications or causing delays that obstruct the 
negotiations. 
The obligation of good faith does not require actual damage; its violation might be 
‘demonstrated by acts and failures to act which, taken together, render the fulfilment of 
specific treaty obligations remote or impossible.’621 However, if the injured State has 
sustained damage, whether material or moral, due to the breach of the duty to negotiate in 
good faith, the responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation including 
restitution in kind, compensation, and satisfaction for the injury caused by the internationally 
wrongful act. Restitution means re-establishing the situation which existed before the 
wrongful act was committed, provided and to the extent that restitution is not materially 
impossible and does not involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit deriving from 
restitution instead of compensation. In cases of fraud, corruption, coercion, and illegal use of 
force, the ex tunc invalidity of the concluded treaty, is part of restitution. If the negotiations 
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fail due to the responsible State engaging in acts frustrating the purposes of the negotiations 
or abusing its rights it must re-establish the situation prior to these acts. 
Insofar as damage is not made good by restitution, the responsible State is under an obligation 
to compensate for the damage caused. Compensation shall cover any financially assessable 
damage. For example, the State responsible for prematurely breaking off negotiations might 
have to compensate an injured State’s investments taken reasonably in reliance on the 
envisaged agreement but rendered futile due to not reaching an agreement. In addition, a State 
responsible, for fraud, corruption, or for not showing up to the negotiating table could be 
liable for compensating costs the injured State undertook to organise, participate in, and 
prepare the negotiations, including administrative and legal costs. Compensation should cover 
the loss of profits insofar as it is established, for example if the envisaged agreement was for a 
profitable cooperation project. Insofar as the injury cannot be made good by restitution or 
compensation, the responsible State is under an obligation to give satisfaction that may 
consist in an acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology, or 
another appropriate modality (ARSIWA Article 37). 
In addition, if the responsible State has breached a treaty obligation, e.g. an express agreement 
to negotiate, a customary international law duty to negotiate in good faith, or refuses cessation 
or reparation, the injured State is entitled to take countermeasures against the responsible 
State to induce that State to comply with its obligations (ARSIWA Articles 49 and 22). 
Countermeasures may be taken in accordance with the requirements set forth in Articles 49-
53 of the ARSIWA, in particular, the requirement of proportionality. Thus, the injured State 
may be excused from certain corresponding obligations with respect to the responsible State, 
the non-performance of which would otherwise amount to an internationally wrongful act.
622
 
In the case of express agreements to negotiate the corresponding obligations might arise from 
the treaty containing the express agreement to negotiate itself but the ARSIWA does not 
preclude non-performance of other international obligations, except for those listed in Article 
50 of the ARSIWA, as a countermeasure. 
In conclusion, a breach of the duty to negotiate in good faith under the law of state 
responsibility results in the obligations of continued performance of the duty to negotiate in 
good faith, cessation and non-repetition of bad faith conduct during negotiations, reparation 
for injury, including by way of restitution, compensation, and satisfaction. In addition the 
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injured State is entitled to take countermeasures in order to induce the responsible State to 
compliance. 
3.3 Consequences of a Possible Breach of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty 
By way of an example, this section of the master thesis aims to analyse the consequences of 
an express agreement to negotiate in good faith, namely Article VI of the NPT, which 
provides: 
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures 
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a 
treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. 
In the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion the ICJ unanimously considered Article VI of the 
NPT a pactum de contrahendo.
623
 Interpreting its decision in Continental Shelf (Tunisia v 
Libya) the ICJ has held that a pactum de contrahendo by which the parties undertake to 
conclude a treaty, entails even a stronger obligation to conduct negotiations in a meaningful 
way compared to mere pactum de negotiando.
624
 Has the obligation in Article VI been 
breached and what would be the consequences resulting from it? 
On  24  April  2014,  the  Marshall  Islands  filed  an  application to the ICJ  instituting 
proceedings  against  the  United  Kingdom, India, and Pakistan.
625
 The Marshall Islands 
contends that 
by not actively pursuing negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the 
nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and instead engaging in conduct that 
directly conflicts with those legally binding commitments, the Respondent has breached and continues 
to breach its legal duty to perform its obligations under the NPT and customary international law in 
good faith.
626
  
The high participation rate and numerous UNGA resolutions regarding nuclear disarmament 
support the position that the obligation in Article VI enjoys customary international law status 
as a basis for the claim against India and Pakistan, which have not ratified the NPT. 
Indeed, after nine review conferences of the NPT, there is no treaty on general and complete 
nuclear disarmament while some measures have been taken with regard to cessation of the 
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nuclear arms race. In 1996, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was signed 
but even this has yet to enter into force, as entry into force is lingering upon signature and 
ratification by India, North Korea and Pakistan and ratification by China, Egypt, Iran, Israel 
and the United States.
627
 After opening the CTBT’s for signature, India and Pakistan tested 
nuclear weapons in 1998, and North Korea has carried out numerous tests.
628
 As there is no 
obligation to ratify a treaty, the non-ratification does not constitute bad faith. However, the 
signatory states are under an obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of the treaty 
(Article 18 VCLT).  In any event, this treaty does not provide for general and complete 
nuclear disarmament. As a pactum de contrahendo the obligation is an obligation of result 
and since there is no treaty on general and nuclear disarmament it is a breach of international 
law by omission.  
The ICJ’s decision that Article VI of the NPT is a pactum de contrahendo has been criticised 
although the provision sets a clear goal, which is supported by the preamble of the NPT. 
Nevertheless, the obligation to reach an agreement entails also the (procedural) obligation to 
negotiate in good faith a breach of which cannot be assessed merely on the basis of a lacking 
result. While during the Cold War the development of international law in general largely 
stood still, there have not been many improvements after the end of Cold War. Besides the 
review conferences of the NPT, there have been no proper negotiations between States 
regarding nuclear disarmament.   
In 2012 the UNGA, at the initiative of Austria, Mexico and Norway, established a UN Open 
Ended Working Group (OEWG) on nuclear disarmament to develop proposals to take 
forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations.
629
 United Kingdom voted against this 
resolution, India and Pakistan abstained.
630
 Thus, the UK has expressed its unwillingness to 
negotiate upon the matter. Moreover, India and Pakistan have tested nuclear weapons, and 
allegedly, the UK is improving its nuclear weapons as well. These activities run counter to the 
object of general and complete nuclear disarmament, i.e. they frustrate the object of the 
‘desired’ treaty, and should negotiations be undertaken, also the purpose of the negotiations. 
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In October 2015, a resolution was adopted to establish a second OEWG to address concrete 
effective legal measures, legal provisions, and norms that will need to be concluded.
631
 The 
establishment of the OEWG, which was also recommended in the Final Draft Document of 
the 2015 NPT Review Conference, was opposed by the permanent members, belonging also 
to the nuclear weapon states, of the UN Security Council: China, France, Russia, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. In December 2015, the UNGA adopted among other 
resolutions concerning nuclear weapons resolutions on ‘Nuclear Disarmament’ and ‘Towards 
a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament 
commitments’.632 With regard to the first, the UK voted against, and India and Pakistan 
abstained. With regard to the latter, the UK and India voted against, and Pakistan abstained. 
Thus, there it seems that there is continuous unwillingness to commence negotiations on 
nuclear disarmament on the part of these States. 
The public hearings at the ICJ on jurisdiction and admissibility in the proceedings brought by 
the Marshall Islands were preceded by the OEWG’s first meeting in February 2016 in 
Geneva, which did not succeed in breaking the stalemate on nuclear weapons disarmament.
633
 
The ICJ is yet to decide on jurisdiction and admissibility. However, leaving the questions of 
jurisdiction and admissibility aside, since no negotiations have been undertaken and no treaty 
on nuclear disarmament reached, there appears to be a breach of Article VI of the NPT by 
way of omission, i.e. failure to start negotiations, but also due to the activities frustrating the 
object, i.e. nuclear disarmament. As nuclear weapons mostly serve the aim of deterrence, it is 
difficult to imagine the applicability of any of the circumstances precluding wrongfulness, in 
particular, self-defence, necessity, or countermeasures. States that have voted for the relevant 
UNGA resolutions cannot also be presumed to have validly consented to such omissions. 
Thus, no circumstances precluding wrongfulness seem to apply. 
The above mentioned activities, i.e. the testing and improvement of nuclear weapons, frustrate 
the object of nuclear disarmament and are presumably attributable to the UK, India and 
Pakistan, e.g. as a result of the activities being carried out under State directions and control. 
Since States have the capacity to conclude treaties, the omission to commence negotiations is 
also attributable to States. However, the omission is attributable not only to the UK, India, 
and Pakistan, but several other States party to the NPT, who, for example, have also expressed 
unwillingness regarding nuclear disarmament negotiations by way of voting against relevant 
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UNGA resolutions and thereby delaying and obstructing the commencement of negotiations. 
Nevertheless, according to Article 47 of the VCLT ‘[w]here several States are responsible for 
the same internationally wrongful act, the responsibility of each State may be invoked in 
relation to that act.’ 
The obligation to negotiate in good faith under Article VI of the NPT is owed to States party 
to the NPT and possibly to the international community as a whole by way of customary 
international law. It is an obligation erga omnes
634
 as nuclear disarmament concerns the 
common welfare. Thus, all States (parties to the NPT) but, in particular, the non-nuclear 
States who in the NPT have undertaken not to acquire nuclear weapons (NPT Article 2) in 
expectation of negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms 
race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament treaty, are specifically affected by the breach of Article VI of the NPT. 
According to Article 46 of the ARSIWA, in such cases, each injured State may separately 
invoke the responsibility of the ‘infringing’ State. The injured State may invoke the 
responsibility in accordance with Articles 46-53 of the ARSIWA and ask the State to: 
1) to adhere to the obligation to negotiate in good faith on effective measures relating to 
cessation of the nuclear arms race and on a treaty on nuclear disarmament, i.e. to 
commence and continue such negotiations in good faith in a meaningful way; 
2) to cease activities frustrating the object of cessation of nuclear arms race and nuclear 
disarmament, such as manufacture, improvement, development, and testing nuclear 
weapons, and to offer appropriate assurance and guarantees of non-repetition; 
3) to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act: 
a.  in particular to restore the situation ex ante, i.e. to destroy any newly acquired 
nuclear weapons, and improvements made thereto;  
b. to compensate any financially assessable damage caused to the injured State 
and not made good by restitution;  
c. insofar as the injury cannot be made good by restitution or compensation, to 
give satisfaction for the injury caused, e.g. by acknowledging the breach, 
expressing regret, or formally apologising. 
In addition, the injured State is entitled to take countermeasures against the responsible 
State(s) in order to induce the State(s) to compliance and may thus be excused from non-
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performance of its own international legal obligations.  Unfortunately, as the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the ICJ is rather an exception than a rule, countermeasures might also be the 
only way of invoking responsibility of the ‘infringing’ State if the latter does not admit 
responsibility in the course of negotiations.
635
 However, due to power imbalances smaller 
States might have scarce possibilities to successfully implement countermeasures.
636
 
Countermeasures are subject to the requirement of proportionality and it would not be 
proportional for the injured State to breach its obligations under Article II of the NPT, i.e. to 
start acquiring nuclear weapons. However, Article VI of the NPT is a provision essential to 
the accomplishment of the purpose of the treaty, the breach of which might amount to a 
material breach and, thus, provide grounds for its termination or suspension of its operation 
according to Article 60 of the VCLT. However, this would be an undesirable consequence for 
the whole international community. Since the obligation in Article VI of the NPT is of an 
erga omnes character, the responsibility may also be invoked by non-injured State(s) but the 
claims are limited to cessation, assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, and performance 
of the obligation of reparation.  
In conclusion, Article VI of the NPT has not been adhered to – no nuclear disarmament 
negotiations have been commenced, and no nuclear disarmament treaty concluded within 46 
years from the entry into force of the NPT. Considering the ICJ’s opinion in the Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory Opinion that the obligation in Article VI of the NPT is a pactum de 
contrahendo it is likely that the ICJ would find a breach of international law. However, it 
remains to be seen whether the ICJ can overcome the jurisdictional and admissibility issues in 
order to decide on the merits of the case brought to it by the Marshall Islands. The 
enforcement of an obligation to negotiate in good faith in a multilateral treaty by the decision 
of the ICJ would nevertheless be problematic as the decision is binding only to the parties to 
the dispute. Thus, due to the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms in international law, 
the lack of political willingness to negotiate a treaty on nuclear disarmament might render 
Article VI of the NPT devoid of legal effect. This should, however, not mean that a duty to 
negotiate in good faith in international law is unnecessary. A clearly stated rule, compliance 
with which is consistently demanded, and the clearly stated consequences of a breach thereof 
will exert a pull towards compliance.
637
 Therefore, in theory and by way of example the sub-
hypothesis that a breach of the obligation to negotiate in good faith entails legal consequences 
has been confirmed. 
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Conclusion 
The master thesis analysed whether in international law States are under a legal obligation to 
negotiate in good faith, the source and essence of such obligation, and the legal consequences 
of a breach thereof. The analysis confirmed the author’s main hypothesis that in international 
law all negotiating States are under a general legal obligation to negotiate in good faith and 
that a breach of the obligation entails legal consequences. The exact content of the obligation 
to negotiate in good faith depends on the circumstances of each particular case but a non-
exhaustive list of obligations is provided in section 1.3. 
More specifically, the author concludes that where there is an express agreement to negotiate, 
whether or not qualified by the words ‘in good faith’, it is to be performed in good faith 
according to the principle of pacta sunt servanda enshrined also in Article 26 of the VCLT. 
The obligation to negotiate might implicitly arise from the nature of the specific international 
law regime itself, such as maritime delimitation, and, thus, States are to perform the 
obligation in good faith in accordance with Article 2(2) of the UN Charter. By virtue of 
Article 2(2) and (3) of the UN Charter the principle of good faith also extends to the peaceful 
settlement of disputes by way of negotiations.  
The VCLT – the main international legal instrument regulating the conclusion of treaties, 
prohibits limited instances of bad faith conduct during treaty negotiations by virtue of the 
grounds of invalidity such as fraud, corruption, coercion, and illegal threat or use of force. 
Fraud and corruption are also general principles of law recognised by civilised nations while 
coercion and illegal use of force are prohibited under customary international law. However, 
extending the obligation not to frustrate the object and purpose of a treaty in Article 18 of the 
VCLT to the negotiating stage contradicts the text of the provision and intentions of the States 
party to the VCLT. Thus, the sub-hypothesis that in international treaty law the obligation to 
negotiate in good faith is recognised only to a limited extent was proved. 
The principles that States are required to negotiate in good faith and must refrain from any 
conduct which might undermine the negotiations are stated in the non-binding UNGA 
resolution 53/101 ‘Principles and guidelines for international negotiations’. The author of the 
master thesis argues that the principles of the resolution are customary international law as 
evidenced by State practice and opinio juris, including the domestic private law rules of the 
civil law legal systems, and as assessed in the relevant circumstances and the wider legal 
framework. The resolution was adopted without a vote and no reservations have been made to 
it. The customary law nature of the principle of sovereign equality of all States, duty of non-
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intervention in domestic matters, (p)acta sunt servanda rule, prohibition of the threat or use of 
force and the invalidating effect of coercion on treaties, duty to cooperate in international 
relations, and duty to settle disputes peacefully spills over to the obligation to negotiate in 
good faith. In addition, the good faith requirement in the context of negotiations is confirmed 
and substantiated in the case law of the international courts. The analysis supported the sub-
hypothesis that the obligation to negotiate in good faith has developed into a norm of 
customary international law. 
To complete the analysis of international law and its sources and to ascertain whether the 
obligation to negotiate in good faith is a general principle common to domestic legal systems, 
the author of the master thesis undertook a comparative analysis of the domestic private law 
rules on pre-contractual liability in the civil law and common law legal traditions. The 
representative sample legal systems were German, French, and Dutch law in the civil law 
tradition and English, the United States, Australian, and Canadian law in the common law 
tradition. The author came to the conclusion that a general obligation to negotiate in good 
faith could not be convincingly derived from the domestic legal systems, and thus confirmed 
the relevant sub-hypothesis. 
On the one hand, the obligation to negotiate in good faith is generally recognised in the civil 
law legal systems as developed in the court practice and/or by way of express provisions in 
the codes. On the other hand, in the common law legal systems there is strong emphasis on 
the freedom of contract and the adversarial nature of commercial negotiations, which has 
resulted in express reluctance to extend the principle of good faith to the negotiating stage 
absent an express and clear agreement to that regard or a specific relationship uberrimae fidei 
where an imbalance of power is often inherent. In the latter case, analogy would not be 
appropriate as in international law the equality of States is recognised despite the power 
imbalances that exist. The piecemeal solutions developed in common law to address 
unfairness are not universally recognised, consistently applied, or as efficient as the doctrine 
of culpa in contrahendo in the civil law tradition. Therefore, a general obligation to negotiate 
in good faith is not a general principle of law recognised by civilised nations. 
Nevertheless, the author argues that in international law the principle of good faith applies to 
all negotiations even when undertaken voluntarily, i.e. lacking an express agreement to that 
regard or an obligation inherent in the specific regime of international law. In principle, States 
are under no obligation to negotiate with other States but they are also not to abuse their 
sovereign right to negotiate. Where States have undertaken negotiations, their conduct and 
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communications prior to the negotiations have culminated in an implied agreement to 
negotiate to which the principle of good faith applies. Although conflicting interests are 
inherent in all negotiations, it would be unreasonable to require them to crystallise into a 
dispute for the principle of good faith to apply. 
In general, the obligation to negotiate in good faith requires States to enter into negotiations 
and pursue them, as far as possible, with a view to concluding agreements; to negotiate in a 
meaningful way, being willing to compromise; to pay reasonable regard to the interests of the 
other; to refrain from fraud, corruption, coercion, and illegal use or threat of force; and to 
refrain from acts frustrating the object and purpose of negotiations. 
A breach of the duty to negotiate in good faith would entail legal consequences under the 
VCLT and the law of State responsibility. In case an express agreement to negotiate has been 
breached, the breach might well amount to a material breach justifying the termination or 
suspension of the treaty under the VCLT. In cases of fraud, corruption, coercion, and illegal 
use of force, the injured State may invoke the invalidity of the treaty and, if successful, claim 
restitution of the situation ex ante. As the law of State responsibility is complementary to the 
VCLT, the injured States are also entitled to remedies under the law of State responsibility. 
Moreover, such remedies are the only possible recourse in case the negotiations have been 
unsuccessful and not resulted in the conclusion of a treaty. 
The remedies under the law of States responsibility are obligations of continued performance 
of the duty to negotiate in good faith, cessation and non-repetition of bad faith conduct during 
negotiations, reparation for injury, including by way of restitution, compensation, and 
satisfaction. In addition, if the responsible State has breached a treaty obligation, e.g. an 
express agreement to negotiate, a customary international law duty to negotiate in good faith, 
or refuses cessation or reparation, the injured State is entitled to take countermeasures against 
the responsible State to induce that State to comply with its obligations. 
By way of an example, the master thesis analysed a possible breach of an express agreement 
in Article VI of the NPT to negotiate in good faith on effective measures on the cessation of 
the nuclear arms race and on a treaty on nuclear disarmament, an issue which is currently also 
on the agenda of the ICJ in claims brought by Marshall Islands against the UK, India and 
Pakistan. The ICJ in the Nuclear Tests advisory opinion has held this obligation to be a 
pactum de contrahendo, not only a mere pactum de negotiando, and therefore, the obligation 
to negotiate in good faith, i.e. in a meaningful way, is even stronger. If the obligation is a 
pactum de contrahendo, i.e. an obligation of result, its breach is manifested by the mere fact 
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that after 46 years of the entry into force of the NPT there is still no treaty on nuclear 
disarmament. Since States have the capacity to conclude treaties it is a breach attributable to 
all States (parties to the NPT).  
Regarding the obligation to negotiate in good faith, some States, such as the UK, India and 
Pakistan, have by improving and testing their nuclear weapons not acted in good faith, i.e. 
they have acted in a way that undermines the object of the desired treaty on nuclear 
disarmament and, if negotiations had been undertaken, also the purpose of the negotiations. 
By voting against relevant UNGA resolutions, they have obstructed the commencement of 
negotiations on nuclear disarmament and expressed their unwillingness to negotiate. Leaving 
issues of admissibility and jurisdiction aside, the author of the master thesis is of the opinion 
that the ICJ would find a breach of international law entailing with it legal consequences both 
under the VCLT and the law of State responsibility. Even so, the enforcement of the decision 
would be problematic as the decision is binding only to the parties to the dispute. Thus, due to 
the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms in international law, the lack of political 
willingness to negotiate a treaty on nuclear disarmament might render Article VI of the NPT 
devoid of legal effect. This should, however, not mean that a duty to negotiate in good faith in 
international law is unnecessary.  
An obligation to negotiate in good faith is a prerequisite for successful negotiations – it 
enhances the predictability of negotiating parties by reducing uncertainty and promoting an 
atmosphere of trust at negotiations. A clearly stated rule leaves less room for differing 
interpretations and provides legal clarity for States regarding their rights and obligations when 
conducting or breaking off negotiations. Moreover, it safeguards the legitimate rights of 
smaller or less powerful States in negotiations at both the bilateral and multilateral levels. A 
clearly stated rule, which is consistently applied or compliance with which is consistently 
demanded, with clearly stated consequences of a breach thereof, will exert a pull towards 
compliance, i.e. prevent States from conducting negotiations in bad faith and abusing their 
rights and bargaining power. 
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Lepingueelsete läbirääkimiste heauskse pidamise kohustus ja selle 
rikkumise tagajärjed rahvusvahelises õiguses  
Resümee 
Läbirääkimised on rahvusvaheliste suhete lahutamatuks osaks. Need on enim kasutatav ja 
tõhusaim meede riikidevahelise koostöö edendamiseks. Rahvusvahelisel tasandil on 
läbirääkimiste protsess suuresti õiguslikult reguleerimata. Väidetakse, et hea usu põhimõte on 
rahvusvahelise õiguse aluspõhimõte ja kohaldub seega ka rahvusvahelistele läbirääkimistele. 
Teisalt on Rahvusvaheline Kohus rõhutanud, et hea usu põhimõte seondub vaid 
olemasolevate kohustuste täitmisega. Oma olemuselt on läbirääkimised aga vabatahtlikud – 
riikidel on suveräänsusest tulenev õigus, mitte kohustus läbirääkimisi pidada. 
Moraalse käitumisjuhisena kohaldub hea usu põhimõte kõikidele rahvusvahelistele 
läbirääkimistele. Käesoleva magistritöö keskseks küsimuseks on, kas sellest tuleneb ka 
õiguslik kohustus, mille rikkumisega kaasnevad õiguslikud tagajärjed. Magistritöö eesmärgiks 
on analüüsida, kas rahvusvahelises õiguses on riikidel kohustus pidada läbirääkimisi heas 
usus, mis on sellise kohustuse allikas ja olemus ning millised tagajärjed toob kaasa selle 
kohustuse rikkumine. Rahvusvahelise õiguse allikad on loetletud Rahvusvahelise Kohtu 
statuudi artikli 38 esimeses lõikes: rahvusvahelised konventsioonid, rahvusvaheline tava, 
õiguse üldprintsiibid, mida tunnustavad tsiviliseeritud rahvad, ning abistavate allikatena 
kohtuotsused ja õigusteadlaste õpetused.  
Sellest tulenevalt on uurimisküsimusele vastamiseks vaja vastata järgnevatele alaküsimustele: 
kas ja mil määral tuleneb lepingueelsete läbirääkimiste heauskse pidamise kohustus 
rahvusvahelisest lepinguõigusest; kas ja mil määral tuleneb lepingueelsete läbirääkimiste 
heauskse pidamise kohustus rahvusvahelisest tavaõigusest; kas lepingueelsete läbirääkimiste 
heauskse pidamise kohustus on siseriiklikes õigussüsteemides tunnustatud õiguse 
üldpõhimõte; kas lepingueelsete läbirääkimiste heauskse pidamise kohustus kohaldub kõigile 
riikidevahelistele läbirääkimistele; kuidas on lepingueelsete läbirääkimiste heauskse pidamise 
kohustus sisustatud; kas ja millised on kohustuse rikkumise tagajärjed. 
Lepingueelsete läbirääkimiste heauskse pidamise kohustus on edukate läbirääkimiste 
eelduseks, suurendades etteaimatavust, vähendades määramatust ning soodustades 
usalduslikku õhkkonda. Lepingueelsete läbirääkimiste heauskse pidamise kohustuse sisu 
analüüs suurendaks õigusselgust riikide õiguste ja kohustuste osas läbirääkimiste pidamisel 
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või katkestamisel. Veelgi enam, see aitaks kaitsta väiksemate riikide nagu Eesti huve ja 
positsiooni rahvusvahelistel läbirääkimistel. 
Riigid ei peaks kartma tugineda oma õigustele, kui vastaspool on rikkunud oma kohustust 
läbirääkimisi heauskselt pidada. Teisalt soodustab selge õigusnormi olemasolu ja järjepidev 
rakendamine normist kinnipidamist. Läbirääkimiste heauskse pidamise kohustuse eesmärgiks 
on tagada rahvusvaheliste suhete stabiilsus ja ühiskonna heaolu, vältides ettearvamatuid 
kahjusid. Kohustus on eriti oluline kiireloomulistes küsimustes nagu näiteks 
rahuläbirääkimised. 
Tänasel päeval on lepingueelsete läbirääkimiste heauskse pidamise kohustus erilise 
tähtsusega, sest läbiräägitavad teemad on muutunud üha keerulisemaks ja sageli on mitmed 
läbirääkimised omavahel põimunud. Riikide käitumine ning läbirääkimiste tulemused võivad 
avaldada olulist mõju nii läbirääkivate riikide suhetele kui ka suhetele teiste riikidega. Üha 
enam toimuvad läbirääkimised riikide ja paremal läbirääkimiste positsioonil olevate 
rahvusvaheliste organisatsioonide vahel. Kuigi käesolev töö käsitleb vaid riikidevahelisi 
läbirääkimisi, võiks kõnealune kohustus laieneda ka rahvusvahelistele organisatsioonidele. 
Läbirääkimiste heauskse pidamise kohustus ei ole vaid teoreetiline probleem – see on olnud ja 
on hetkelgi rahvusvaheliste kohtute päevakorras. Näiteks on Alalise Vahekohtu menetluses 
kohtuasi, kus Timor-Leste püüab tühistada väidetavalt pettuse teel Austraaliaga sõlmitud 
lepingut. Teise näitena on Marshalli Saared pöördunud Rahvusvahelisse Kohtusse 
Ühendkuningriikide, Pakistani ja India vastu väitega, et nood on rikkunud 1968. a 
tuumarelvade leviku tõkestamise lepingu artiklist 6 tulenevat kohustust pidada heas usus 
läbirääkimisi efektiivsete abinõude üle tuumarelvastumise võidujooksu lõpetamiseks ja 
täieliku tuumadesarmeerimise lepingu üle. Vastavat lepingut pole tänaseni sõlmitud. 
Magistritöö eesmärgist lähtuvalt on autor läbi töötanud ja analüüsinud nii rahvusvahelist kui 
siseriiklikku õigust ja kohtupraktikat ning inglisekeelset akadeemilist kirjandust, et jaotatuna 
kolme peatükki anda süsteemne ülevaade rahvusvahelise õiguse hetkeseisust lepingueelsete 
läbirääkimiste heauskse pidamise kohustuse ning selle rikkumise tagajärgede osas.  
Töö esimeses peatükis analüüsib ning tõlgendab autor ÜRO harta ning Rahvusvaheliste 
lepingute Viini õiguse konventsiooni (edaspidi Viini lepinguõiguse konventsioon) sätteid, 
milles hea usu põhimõte avaldub, ning uurib, kuidas on läbirääkimiste heauskse pidamise 
kohustust sisustatud rahvusvaheliste kohtute praktikas. Autor annab hinnangu lepingueelsete 
läbirääkimiste heauskse pidamise kohustuse võimalikule tavaõiguslikule staatusele, 
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analüüsides riikide praktikat ning õigusveenet, sh ÜRO Resolutsiooni 53/101 „Printsiibid ja 
juhised rahvusvahelisteks läbirääkimisteks“ juba kinnistunud rahvusvahelise õiguse 
üldpõhimõtete ning rahvusvaheliste kohtute praktika valguses. Kinnitust leiavad hüpoteesid, 
et rahvusvahelises lepinguõiguses on läbirääkimiste heauskse pidamise kohustust reguleeritud 
piiratud ulatuses, et lepingueelsete läbirääkimiste heauskse pidamise kohustus on kujunenud 
rahvusvahelise tavaõiguse normiks ning et kohustus laieneb kõigile riikidevahelistele 
läbirääkimistele. 
Töö teises peatükis analüüsib autor võrdlevat meetodit kasutades, kas hea usu põhimõte on 
riikide poolt tunnustatud õiguse üldpõhimõttena. Rahvusvahelise Kohtu statuudi artikkel 38 lg 
1 punkti c kohaselt ei ole selleks, et mingit põhimõtet saaks rahvusvahelises õiguses 
tunnustada õiguse üldpõhimõttena,  nõutav selle põhimõtte tunnustatus kõigis siseriiklikes 
õigussüsteemides. Seetõttu ei ole käesoleva töö võrdleva analüüsi puhul tegu kõikehõlmava 
analüüsiga, vaid tsiviilõiguse (civil law) ja üldise õiguse (common law) õigustraditsioone 
esindavate riikide siseriiklike õigussüsteemide võrdlusega. Võrreldavad riigid on valitud K. 
Zweigerti ja H. Kötzi õigusperekondade jaotuse järgi ning hõlmavad tsiviilõiguse 
õigustraditsioonis Saksamaa, Prantsusmaa ja Hollandi ning üldise õiguse õigustraditsioonis 
Inglismaa, USA, Austraalia ja Kanada. 
Võrdlus piirdub tavapäraselt lepinguvälise vastutuse küsimusi reguleeriva eraõiguse 
analüüsiga, eelkõige lepinguõiguse ja deliktiõigusega. Võrdleva analüüsi raskuskese on üldise 
õiguse õigustraditsioonil, sest küsimus on seal vastuolulisem. Töös toetutakse 
pretsedendiõigusel põhineva üldise õiguse käsitluse osas ulatuslikult sekundaarkirjandusele, 
kuna magistritöö autoril on vaid vähene isiklik kokkupuude üldise õigusega. Lisaks toetub 
autor sekundaarkirjandusele ka Saksamaa, Prantsusmaa ja Hollandi kohtupraktika osas. 
Kinnitust leiab hüpotees, et lepingueelsete läbirääkimiste heauskse pidamise kohustus ei ole 
siseriiklikes õigussüsteemides üldtunnustatud. 
Töö kolmandas peatükis annab autor ülevaate lepingueelsete läbirääkimiste heauskse 
pidamise kohustuse rikkumise tagajärgedest nii Viini lepinguõiguse konventsiooni kui ka 
rahvusvahelise riigivastutuse õiguse alusel. Tagajärgi näitlikustatakse rakendades 
asjakohaseid norme tuumarelvade leviku tõkestamise lepingust tuleneva 
läbirääkimiskohustuse võimalikule rikkumisele. Kinnitust leiab hüpotees, et lepingueelsete 
läbirääkimiste heauskse pidamise kohustuse rikkumisele kohalduvad õiguslikud tagajärjed.  
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Seega kinnitavad analüüsi tulemused magistritöö põhihüpoteesi, et rahvusvahelises õiguses on 
riikidel kohustus lepingueelseid läbirääkimisi heas usus pidada ning et selle rikkumisele on 
kohaldatavad õiguslikud tagajärjed. Järgnevalt antakse täpsem ülevaade töö järeldustest. 
Autor väidab, et rahvusvahelises lepinguõiguses on lepingueelsete läbirääkimiste kohustust 
reguleeritud vaid piiratud ulatuses. Kaks peamist lepingute sõlmimist reguleerivat allikat – 
ÜRO harta ja Viini lepinguõiguse konventsioon – ei sisalda sõnaselget kohustust 
lepingueelseid läbirääkimisi heas usus pidada. Kui vastav kohustus tuleneb sõnaselgelt 
riikidevahelisest lepingust või on vältimatu rahvusvahelise õiguse valdkonna eripärast 
tulenevalt, tuleb lepingueelseid läbirääkimisi pidada ÜRO harta artikli 2 lõike 2 ja Viini 
lepinguõiguse konventsiooni artikli 26 kohaselt heas usus. Samuti laieneb hea usu põhimõte 
vaidluste rahumeelsele lahendamisele läbirääkimiste teel.  
Kokkuvõtlikult on Rahvusvaheline Kohus kirjeldanud läbirääkimiste heauskse pidamise sisu 
nii läbirääkimiste kohustuse täitmise kui ka vaidluste lahendamise kontekstis Interim Accord 
kohtuasjas. Nimelt on riikidel kohustus läbirääkimistesse asuda ning neid pidada lepingu 
sõlmimise eesmärgiga, kuid üldjuhul ei kaasne sellega kohustust lepingut sõlmida. Riikidel on 
kohustus mõistlikult arvestada üksteise huvidega ning pidada tähendusrikkaid läbirääkimisi, 
mh olla valmis kompromissideks ning mitte takistada läbirääkimisi. 
Viini lepinguõiguse konventsioon keelustab läbirääkimiste pidamisel pettuse, korruptsiooni, 
sunni ning õigusvastase relvastatud jõuga ähvardamise või selle kasutamise (artiklid 49-52). 
Pettuse ja korruptsiooni keeldu käsitletakse kui siseriiklikes õigussüsteemides tunnustatud 
õiguse üldpõhimõtteid. Sunni ja jõu kasutamise keeld omavad aga rahvusvahelist 
tavaõiguslikku staatust. Riikide kohustus hoiduda lepingu mõtte ja eesmärgiga vastuolus 
olevatest toimingutest kuni lepingu jõustumiseni (artikkel 18) ei laiene lepingueelsetele 
läbirääkimistele. Kuigi vastavad ideed käisid Rahvusvahelise Õiguse Komisjoni 
ettevalmistavates töödes läbi, ei leidnud need riikide poolehoidu, sest vajaka oli vastavat 
normi toetavast riikide praktikast. Kohustust ei ole võimalik laiendada läbirääkimistele ka 
tõlgendamise teel, sest see oleks vastuolus sätte sõnastuse ning riikide tahtega. 
Autori hinnangul on nimetatud kohustus siiski kujunenud rahvusvahelise tavaõiguse normiks. 
Nii sätestab ÜRO Peaassamblee 1999. a resolutsioon 53/101 „Printsiibid ja juhised 
rahvusvahelisteks läbirääkimisteks“, et riigid peavad lepingueelseid läbirääkimisi pidama heas 
usus, püüdma säilitada konstruktiivset õhkkonda ning hoiduma tegevusest, mis võib 
kahjustada läbirääkimisi ja nende edu. Kuigi ÜRO Peaassamblee resolutsioonid ei ole 
õiguslikult siduvad, annavad selle vastuvõtmise asjaolud alust pidada selles sisalduvaid 
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printsiipe siduvaks tavaõiguse alusel. Eelnimetatud resolutsioon võeti vastu hääletuseta ning 
sellele ei ole tehtud reservatsioone. Resolutsioon rõhutab mitmeid rahvusvahelises õiguses 
kinnistunud printsiipe, mis omavad tähtsust läbirääkimiste puhul, nagu näiteks riikide 
suveräänne võrdsus, (p)acta sunt servanda, jõuga ähvardamise ja jõu kasutamise keeld, 
kohustus teha koostööd rahvusvahelistes suhetes, vaidluste rahumeelse lahendamise kohustus 
jm., ning sisaldab läbirääkimistele kohalduvaid nõudeid, mida on järjepidevalt rõhutatud ja 
rakendatud ka rahvusvaheliste kohtute praktikas. Seega on lepingueelsete läbirääkimiste 
heauskse pidamise kohustus kujunenud rahvusvaheliseks tavaõiguslikuks standardiks. 
Autori arvates ei ole aga käesoleval hetkel võimalik siseriiklikest õigussüsteemidest tuletada 
lepingueelsete läbirääkimiste heauskse pidamise kohustust kui õiguse üldpõhimõtet, mida 
tunnustavad tsiviliseeritud rahvad. Kuigi UNIDROIT Rahvusvaheliste kaubanduslepingute 
printsiibid (PICC), Euroopa lepinguõiguse printsiibid (PECL) ja ühtse tugiraamistiku kavand 
(DCFR) sisaldavad sätteid lepingueelsete läbirääkimiste heauskse pidamise kohustuse kohta, 
puudub näiteks ÜRO konventsioonis kaupade rahvusvahelise ostu-müügi lepingute kohta 
(CISG) vastav säte. CISG-i ettevalmistavad materjalid annavad aimu põhimõttelistest 
eriarvamustest hea usu põhimõtte tunnustamise osas tsiviilõiguse ja üldise õiguse 
õigustraditsioonides.  
Võrdleva analüüsi tulemusena järeldab magistritöö autor, et erinevalt tsiviilõiguse 
õigustraditsioonist ei ole üldise õiguse õigustraditsioonis lepingueelsete läbirääkimiste 
heauskse pidamise kohustus üldtunnustatud. Tsiviilõiguse õigustraditsioonis on levinud 
lepingueelse vastutuse doktriini – culpa in contrahendo – tunnustamine kas kohtupraktikas 
hea usu üldpõhimõttele tuginemise kaudu või lausa sõnaselgelt seaduses. Sarnaselt 
rahvusvahelisele õigusele ei ole läbirääkivatel pooltel kohustust jõuda kokkuleppele, kuid nad 
peavad läbirääkimistesse asuma ning neid pidama siira sooviga saavutada kokkulepe. Pooltel 
on kohustus arvestada teise poole huvidega ning mitte pahauskselt läbirääkimisi katkestada. 
Lisaks lasuvad läbirääkivatel pooltel ulatuslikud täpse ja õige olulise informatsiooni 
avaldamise kohustused. Lepingueelsetel läbirääkimistel pahauskselt käitunud pool on 
kohustatud kompenseerima teisele poolele tekkinud usalduskahju.  
Traditsiooniliselt on pretsedendil põhinevale Inglise õigusele, mis on oluliselt mõjutanud ka 
teisi üldise õiguse õigussüsteeme, olnud vastumeelt üldise hea usu põhimõtte tunnustamine. 
Ebaõigluse vältimiseks rakendatakse kohtupraktikas tükiti välja kujunenud konstruktsioone, 
sh lepingu tõlgendamist ning tuletatud tingimuste doktriini. Kohustuse heauskse täitmise nõue 
laieneb reeglina vaid teatud ülima hea usu (uberrimae fidei) lepingutele või juhul, kui hea usu 
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kohustus tuleneb eriseadusest, nt tarbijakaitseõiguse puhul. Sellistele suhetele on omane 
pooltevaheline ebavõrdsus, mistõttu ei ole selles osas põhimõte ülekantav rahvusvahelisse 
õigusesse, kus tunnustatakse kõikide suveräänsete riikide võrdsust hoolimata tegelikult 
valitsevatest jõuvahekordadest. 
Siiski on Inglise õigus liikumas üldise heauskse täitmise kohustuse tunnustamise suunas, 
taunides lepinguliste õiguste kuritarvitamist ning jõustades lepinguga sõnaselgelt võetud hea 
usu kohustusi. Ka Austraalias on kohtud vastavaid lepingusätteid jõustanud ning püüdnud hea 
usu põhimõtet lepingutele laiendada isegi kui õigusest tulenevat kohustust, kuid Austraalia 
ülemkohus pole veel seisukohta võtnud. Erinevalt Inglise õigusest on USA õiguses Saksa 
õiguse mõjul lepingute heauskse täitmise kohustus tunnustatud Ühtses Kaubanduskoodeksis. 
Kanada ülemkohus on hiljuti lahendis Bhasin v Hrynew tunnustanud hea usu põhimõtet kui 
lepinguõiguse üldpõhimõtet, mis kõigi lepingute puhul tähendab minimaalselt aususkohustust. 
Üldise õiguse õigustraditsioonis ei ole lepingueelsete läbirääkimiste heauskse pidamise 
kohustus üldtunnustatud. See oleks vastuolus lepinguvabaduse põhimõtte ning vastutasu ja 
kindluse kui üldise õiguse oluliste lepingu jõustatavuse tingimustega. Kuulsas Walford v 
Miles kohtuasjas on peetud kokkuleppeid pidada heas usus läbirääkimisi täitmisele 
mittepööratavateks nende ebamäärasuse tõttu. Hilisemas üldise õiguse kohtupraktikas on 
hakatud taolisi kokkuleppeid jõustama, kuid seda reeglina vaid sõnaselge ning täpse 
lepingulise kohutuse olemasolul ehk vastavalt poolte selgelt väljendatud tahtele. Kokkuleppe 
puudumisel hea usu põhimõte lepingueelsetele läbirääkimistele ei laiene.  
Tükiti väljakujunenud lahendused ebaõigluse vältimiseks, nagu näiteks alusetu rikastumine 
ning tuginemine vastutasuta lubadusele (promissory estoppel), millest viimane ei ole hagi 
alusena tunnustatud ei Inglise ega Kanada õiguses, pole kaugeltki nii tõhusad kui culpa in 
contrahendo doktriin. Üldise õiguse õigustraditsioonis on lepingueelsetel läbirääkimistel 
poolte kohustused reeglina piiratud vaid ebaõigete andmete esitamise keeluga, mis võib olla 
lepingu tühistamise aluseks. Kahju hüvitamise eelduseks on aga reeglina deliktiõigusliku 
pettuse tõendamine. 
Autor leiab, et rahvusvahelises õiguses on riikidel kohustus kõiki lepingueelseid läbirääkimisi 
heas usus pidada. Õigusalases kirjanduses on pikema analüüsita nenditud hea usu 
üldpõhimõtte kohaldumist rahvusvahelistele suhetele, sh kõigile riikidevahelistele 
lepingueelsetele läbirääkimistele. Rahvusvaheline Kohus on rõhutanud hea usu põhimõtte 
kohalduvust vaid olemasolevatele kohustustele, kuid üldjuhul on läbirääkimiste pidamine riigi 
suveräänne õigus, mitte kohustus. Riigid ei tohi seda õigust kuritarvitada. Isegi kui 
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läbirääkimisi on alustatud ilma vastava sõnaselge või rahvusvahelise õiguse valdkonna 
eripärast tuleneva kohustuseta, saab riikide käitumisest läbirääkimiste eel tuletada kokkuleppe 
läbirääkimisteks, millele kohaldub pacta sunt servanda põhimõte.  
Ülalnimetatud ÜRO Peaassamblee resolutsiooni kohaldamisala ei ole piiratud vaid vaidluste 
lahendamise kontekstiga, vaid hõlmab ka rahvusvahelise suhtekorralduse ning uute 
rahvusvaheliste käitumisnormide loomise. Ka rahvusvaheliste kohtute praktikas on 
tunnustatud hea usu põhimõtte olulisust läbirääkimiste kontekstis üleüldiselt. Ebamõistlik 
oleks hea usu põhimõtte kohaldumiseks nõuda, et riikide vahel oleks läbirääkimiste käigus 
tekkinud konflikt või vaidlus. Lepingueelsete läbirääkimiste heauskse pidamise kohustuse 
laienemine kõigile riikidevahelistele läbirääkimistele on oluline  rahvusvaheliste suhete 
stabiilsuse ning rahu tagamiseks. 
Lepingueelsete läbirääkimiste heauskse pidamise kohustuse rikkumisega kaasnevad 
õiguslikud tagajärjed. Kui tegu on lepingulise kohustusega võib läbirääkimistesse 
mitteasumise või nende pahauskse pidamise korral äärmisel juhul tegu olla lepingu olulise 
rikkumisega, mis annab aluse Viini lepinguõiguse konventsiooni alusel lepingu täitmise 
peatamiseks või lepingu lõpetamiseks. Pettuse, korruptsiooni, sunni ning jõuga ähvardamise 
või jõu kasutamise tulemusena sõlmitud lepingu saab Viini lepinguõiguse konventsiooni 
alusel tühistada. Lisaks või alternatiivselt juhul, kui läbirääkimised on ebaõnnestunud ja 
lepingut pole sõlmitud, on rahvusvahelise riigivastutuse õiguse alusel võimalik nõuda 
kohustuse täitmist, rikkumise lõpetamist ja tagatisi rikkumise mittekordamiseks ning 
reparatsiooni, sh restitutsiooni ehk rikkumisele eelneva olukorra taastamist, kompensatsiooni 
ehk rahalist hüvitist ning satisfikatsiooni ehk rikkumise tunnistamist ning vabandust. Lisaks 
võib kannatanuriigil olla õigus võtta vastumeetmeid sundimaks rikkuvat riiki oma kohustuste 
täitmisele. 
Lepingueelsete läbirääkimiste heauskse pidamise kohustuse rikkumise tagajärgi on 
magistritöös ilmestatud tuumarelvade leviku tõkestamise lepingu artikli 6 võimaliku 
rikkumise näitel. See kohustab osalisriike läbi rääkima, mh tuumadesarmeerimise lepingu üle. 
Marshalli Saared on pöördunud Rahvusvahelisse Kohtusse Ühendkuningriigi, India ning 
Pakistani vastu, väites, et nood on rikkunud läbirääkimiste heauskse pidamise kohustust. 
Rahvusvaheline Kohus on varasemalt oma Nuclear Weapons nõuandvas arvamuses 
käsitlenud tuumarelvade leviku tõkestamise artiklit 6 mitte pelgalt läbirääkimiste pidamise 
kohustusena, vaid kokkuleppe saavutamise kohustusena. Kuna tuumadesarmeerimise lepingut 
ei ole sõlmitud, siis on tegu rikkumisega. Läbirääkimiste heauskse pidamise kohustust on 
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rikutud ka seetõttu, et tuumarelvi katsetades ja arendades on käitutud vastuolus soovitud 
lepingu eesmärgiga. Samuti on kohustusega vastuolus lepingueelsetesse läbirääkimistesse 
mitteasumine ning nende takistamine, hääletades oluliste teemakohaste ÜRO Peaassamblee 
resolutsioonide vastu. Kohustuse rikkumine toob kaasa ülalkirjeldatud õiguslikud tagajärjed. 
Kuna Rahvusvahelise Kohtu kohtualluvus on pigem erand kui reegel, siis võib rikkuva riigi 
vastutuselevõtmine olla keeruline ning näitab rahvusvahelise õiguse mõningast ebaefektiivust. 
Sellest hoolimata on lepingueelsete läbirääkimiste heauskse pidamise kohustusel oluline roll 
rikkumiste ärahoidmisel ning rahvusvaheliste suhete stabiilsuse tagamisel. 
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